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1. From boom to bust to Boétie 
 
In 1999, as the Internet boom was approaching its apex, Lucent Technologies was the 
world’s largest telecommunications equipment company. With revenues of $38.3 billion, 
net income of $4.8 billion, and 153,000 employees for the fiscal year ending September 
30, 1999, Lucent was larger and more profitable than Nortel, Alcatel, and Ericsson, its 
three major global competitors (see Figures 1 and 2).1
 
 In fiscal 2006, however, Lucent’s 
revenues were only $8.8 billion and its employment level stood at 29,800. Both figures 
were lower than those of its three major rivals, even though all of the companies had 
gone through wrenching declines as the Internet boom turned to bust in the early 2000s.    
Like Lucent, both Nortel and Alcatel struggled to return to profitability after the depths of 
the downturn in 2002-2003. But on December 1, 2006 Alcatel was almost twice the size 
of Lucent in terms of revenues and employees when the merger that created Alcatel-
Lucent took place. Lucent became a wholly-owned subsidiary of Alcatel. Although 
Lucent CEO Patricia Russo was named the first CEO of Alcatel-Lucent, she occupied her 
new position at Alcatel headquarters at 54, rue La Boétie in Paris. 
 
In this paper, we analyze the rise and demise of Lucent Technologies from the time that it 
was spun off from AT&T in April 1996 to its merger with Alcatel in December 2006.  
The analysis, contained in the three sections that form the body of this paper, considers 
three questions concerning Lucent’s performance over the decade of its existence.   
 
1. How was Lucent, with over $20 billion in sales in 1995 as a division of AT&T, able 
to almost double its size by achieving a compound growth rate of over 17 percent per 
year from 1995 to 1999? 
 
2. What was the relationship between Lucent’s growth strategy during the Internet boom 
and the company’s financial difficulties in the Internet crash of 2001-2003 when the 
Lucent was on the brink of bankruptcy?  
 
3. After extensive restructuring during the telecommunications industry downturn of 
2001-2003, why was Lucent unable to re-emerge as an innovative competitor in the 
communications equipment industry when the industry recovered?   
                                                 
1 Lucent’s other significant competitors in the communications equipment industry in the late 1990s were 
Fujitsu, NEC, GEC (Marconi), Siemens, Nokia, Motorola, Tellabs, and newcomers Ciena and Cisco. In 
fiscal 2000 Lucent, with $41.4 billion and 157,000 employees, Lucent remained larger than its rivals but 
for its decision to divest its enterprise division Avaya on the very last day of the fiscal year, and thus 
record revenues of only $33.8 billion and employment of only 126,000 billion. In this paper, we correct 
for this accounting obfuscation.  
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Figure 1:  Revenues and net income, Alcatel, Ericsson, Lucent, Nortel, 1995-2006 
US$ billions 
0
5
10
15
20
25
30
35
40
45
1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006
re
ve
nu
es
, U
S$
 b
ill
io
ns
-30
-25
-20
-15
-10
-5
0
5
10
ne
t i
nc
om
e,
 U
S$
 b
ill
io
ns
Alcatel Ericsson Lucent Nortel Alcatel Ericsson Lucent Nortel
 
 
Notes:  Fiscal years ending September 30 for Lucent and December 31 for Alcatel, Ericsson, and Nortel. 
Lucent’s 1995 revenues reflect sales of AT&T activities spun off as Lucent in the IPO on April 10, 1996. 
Lucent’s net income for 1995 is an estimate of the net income of the AT&T activities spun off as Lucent, 
adjusted for the change of fiscal year from ending on December 31 to ending on September 30. 
Lucent’s net income for 1996 includes restructuring charges of $2.8 billion in the fourth quarter of calendar 
1995 while it was part of AT&T in anticipation of the divestiture of Lucent. 
 Lucent’s 2000 revenues and net income include those for its Enterprise Networks division that was spun off as   
Avaya on September 30, 2000. 
Source: Standard and Poor’s Compustat database; Avaya 10-K filing, 2000, 49. 
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Figure 2: Employees, Alcatel, Ericsson, Lucent, Nortel, end of fiscal year, 1995-2006 
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Notes: Alcatel employment of 59,509 for 2006 does not include 29,861 employees who joined Alcatel-Lucent from 
Lucent on December 1, 2006. 
Lucent 2000 employment includes 31,000 employees of the Enterprise Networks division that was spun off as 
Avaya on September 30, 2000. 
Source: Standard and Poor’s Compustat database; Avaya 10-K filing, 2000, 21. 
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In the next section of the paper, we show that the main source of Lucent’s growth in the 
period 1995-1999 was its “incumbent’s advantage”. During these boom years, Lucent 
was able to sell more of its legacy telecommunications equipment to its legacy customers 
as households subscribed to additional “twisted-pair” copper telephone lines dedicated to 
“dialup” Internet. Then toward the end of the Internet boom, the focus of the 
telecommunications industry shifted toward the installation of optical networking 
equipment and, relatedly, the provision of broadband access to households. Lucent 
stepped up its sales of this equipment to “next-generation” service providers, using 
ample, and risky, vendor financing to secure the contracts. The company also did a large 
number of acquisitions, typically using its stock as payment, of young technology 
companies, many of which did not have a commercial product. In addition, in 2000 at the 
peak of the boom, eager to support its stock-price performance, Lucent engaged in some 
dubious accounting practices designed to inflate its reported sales. 
 
We then turn to Lucent’s financial turmoil in the collapse of demand for 
telecommunications equipment in the crash of 2001-2003. As can be seen in Figure 2 
above, Lucent was compelled to slash its payroll in order to stay afloat. In the process, 
the company disposed of business units that would be needed when the demand for 
communications equipment would improve. The company also laid off thousands of 
skilled and experienced employees who would later be difficult to replace in a more 
propitious economic climate. Along with this massive downsizing, and burdened with a 
junk bond rating, Lucent averted bankruptcy in 2001 and 2002 by selling its stock at one 
or two percent of the price that it had commanded in the speculative boom. 
 
As a result of its financial excesses in the Internet boom and its desperate downsizing in 
the subsequent crash, Lucent was in a weakened position for reestablishing itself as a 
leading communications technology company when, from 2003, the industry recovered. 
The industry’s key growth businesses were now enterprise networking and wireless.  But 
as a result of the spinoff of its enterprise networks division in late 2000, Lucent no longer 
possessed the capability to serve this market. In wireless, Lucent needed to generate 
products for both the CDMA2000 and UMTS standards. It did not, however, possess the 
financial resources to make serious progress in next-generation UMTS, which was as it 
turned out the most rapidly growing global wireless standard. In December 2006, with its 
revenues down to $8.8 billion, its net income at $527 million, and its employment cut to 
less than 30,000, Lucent became part of Alcatel. 
  
2. A “127-year-old startup” 
 
A brief pre-history of Lucent Technologies 
 
Lucent can date its origins back to Cleveland, Ohio in 1869 when Elisha Gray and Enos 
Barton launched a company that manufactured telegraph equipment for Western Union.  
In 1872 the firm was reorganized as Western Electric Manufacturing Company, with its 
headquarters in Chicago. In 1881 American Telephone & Telegraph acquired a 
controlling interest in Western Electric. Subsequently, as AT&T’s wholly-owned 
subsidiary, Western Electric became its exclusive manufacturer of telecommunications 
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equipment.  In 1913 AT&T became a regulated monopoly for the provision of telephone 
service in the United States, thus making Western Electric in effect a monopolist in the 
provision of telephone equipment and infrastructures. In 1970 Western Electric had a 
peak employment of over 215,000 people, making the company the 7th largest employer 
among the Fortune 500.2
 
  
In 1907 AT&T and Western Electric combined their engineering departments, and in 
1925 turned this organization into the jointly-owned Bell Laboratories. The result was the 
world’s premier corporate research lab of the 20th century. With its invention of the 
transistor in 1947, Bell Labs was in the forefront of the microelectronics revolution of the 
last half of the 20th century. Subsequently Bell Labs was a pioneer in, among other 
things, digital, optical, and wireless technologies (see Baker et al. 2000). 
  
In 1949 the US Department of Justice launched an antitrust suit against AT&T that 
sought to sever the exclusive access of AT&T to Western Electric’s manufacturing 
capabilities. The result was a 1956 consent decree that allowed AT&T to maintain control 
over its manufacturing arm but barred the company from competing in industries other 
than telecommunications. In addition, AT&T and Western Electric were required to 
license their patents to other companies at reasonable fees (Lewis 1956).  As a result Bell 
Labs’ R&D supported the development of the information and communication 
technology industries, while AT&T remained the ubiquitous telephone services company.  
 
Beginning in the late 1960s AT&T was challenged by new entrants into the long-distance 
business (in particular MCI) who demanded access to the AT&T transmission 
infrastructure. In 1974 the US Department of Justice launched an antitrust suit against 
AT&T that on January 1, 1984 resulted in the breakup of the Bell System. The breakup 
created seven regional Bell operating companies, or RBOCs, out of AT&T, leaving 
AT&T Corp. as a competitive long-distance service company that also included Western 
Electric and Bell Labs as the AT&T Technologies division. AT&T now was excluded 
from entering local telephone markets, where the RBOCs were allowed to operate as 
regulated monopolies. Despite this limitation, AT&T was confident it could sustain 
profitable growth by capitalizing on Bell Labs technology and Western Electric 
manufacturing and product management expertise that it strategically retained. 
 
The 1982 modification of the 1956 consent decree that underlay the breakup of the Bell 
System left AT&T free to enter the computer industry. Toward that end, during 1991 
AT&T acquired NCR in a $7.4 billion hostile takeover. Originally known as National 
Cash Register, NCR was a company that itself dated back to 1884. AT&T supplemented 
its internally developed computer products with NCR products to create a portfolio that 
made use of NCR marketing expertise and sales channels in the commercial computer 
market. 
 
                                                 
2 In 1970 AT&T itself employed 773,000 people, but, as a service company, was not included in the 
Fortune 500 list of the largest industrial companies based in the United States. In 1996 Fortune changed 
its classification system to include service companies in the Fortune 500. 
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Then in September 1995 AT&T announced that it would spin off Lucent and NCR in 
what became known as the “trivestiture”. The direct impetus for the trivestiture was the 
pending passage of the Telecommunications Act of 1996 which would open up 
competition across all lines of business within the telecommunications industry.  
Restrictions to entering long distance and local service markets would be lifted, making it 
possible for AT&T and the RBOCs to become direct competitors. As a result, AT&T’s 
most important customers, the RBOCs, became reluctant to place orders with AT&T 
Technologies, given that equipment orders would provide sensitive market strategy and 
capacity information to AT&T, their emerging competitor. Likewise, AT&T would now 
have a strong incentive to procure telecommunications equipment from suppliers other 
than its own manufacturing division to reach cost-performance parity with its RBOC 
competitors. Since both competitive forces would result in a decline in AT&T 
Technologies revenue, divestiture became inevitable.  
 
Meanwhile AT&T had failed to integrate NCR (which as an AT&T division became 
known as Global Information Solutions, or GIS) into its operations. Given that AT&T 
would now be a focused telecommunications service provider, it made sense to expand 
the divestiture of AT&T Technologies into a “trivestiture” that spun off GIS, now 
renamed NCR, along with Lucent Technologies. 
 
A “start-up” with 11 “hot businesses” 
 
Lucent’s IPO in April 1996 was the largest in US history up to that time. Lucent 
executives were fond of saying that their company was a “127-year-old startup that had 
well over $20 billion in annual sales”.  Figure 3 shows the organization chart of Lucent as 
a “start-up”. Running the company was Henry Schacht, an AT&T board member since 
1981 who in 1995, at the age of 60, had retired as chairman of Cummins Engine (Endlich 
2004, ch. 3). Below Schacht, as Lucent’s president and COO, was 46-year-old Rich 
McGinn, a veteran of two decades in the Bell System who, despite having only an 
undergraduate degree as a history major from Grinnell College in Iowa, had risen to be 
head of AT&T’s Network Systems group. It was generally recognized that McGinn was 
Schacht’s heir apparent (Endlich 2004. 32), and indeed in October 1997, McGinn took 
over from Schacht as CEO (see Figure 4). 
 
When McGinn became CEO, a press release quoted him as saying that he viewed 
“Lucent as a group of hot businesses, tightly focused on its customers, markets and 
competitors” (Business Wire 1997b). Effective November 1, 1997, the company was 
reorganized around 11 “hot businesses” so that it could, in McGinn’s words, “provide 
more focus to the business internally, while giving a single face to our customers 
externally. We are organizing for growth.” While over time, some of these units were 
sold or spun off, and while, especially in the period 1998-2000, acquisitions augmented 
the capabilities that many of these units possessed, these 11 businesses encompassed the 
revenue-generating activities that would define Lucent over the decade of its existence. 
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Figure 3: Lucent Technologies Organization Chart, September 1996 
 
 
Figure 4: Lucent Technologies Organization Chart, November 1997 
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These 11 businesses can be grouped into four broader product categories: 
• Core network products: 
 
Switching and Access
  
. The dominant product was the 5ESS switch that Lucent would 
attempt to retain as the centerpiece of its network strategy even as circuit switching 
migrated over to packet switch data networks. Switching and Access was the largest 
revenue business unit within Lucent in the late 1990s, but with changes in network 
technology, this “giant” would, as “Converged Core Solutions”, represent less than seven 
percent of Lucent’s revenues in its last year of existence. During the last half of the 
1990s, however, sales of the 5ESS and related hardware and software were central to 
Lucent’s growth. 
Optical Networking
 
. This business unit was the former transmission systems unit, 
offering products that supported point-to-point transmission, network traffic routing, and 
traffic consolidation or multiplexing equipment. During its lifespan, Lucent continued to 
offer products connected to copper cables, predominately for local-loop networks. The 
Optical Networking unit was, however, rapidly introducing new optical-based products to 
support service provider initiatives to create new networks that could take advantage of 
the increased speed and capacity provided by optical fiber transmission. By the 2000s this 
unit would become a victim of the very technological advances to which it, with the help 
of Bell Labs, contributed. The massive build-out of high-speed, high-capacity optical 
networks resulted in a glut of digital communications transmission capacity.    
Wireless Networking
 
. By forming a separate wireless unit from the outset, Lucent 
acknowledged the growth potential in this area. The unit focused on developing wireless 
network equipment, in direct competition with Ericsson. Initially Lucent offered products 
compatible with the most widely used wireless transmission standards: AMPS, CDMA, 
TDMA, and GSM. In 1996 Lucent secured a contract with Sprint PCS to build 60 percent 
of its 2G wireless infrastructure (Wall Street Journal 1996), thus enabling the company to 
obtain significant US business outside the old Bell System. As wireless communications 
expanded from simple voice to the “triple play” of voice, data, and video – that is from 
2G to 3G – it was necessary for Lucent to select the standards in which it would invest. 
Lucent chose CDMA2000 and UMTS, thus positioning it to compete in North America, 
Europe, and Asia. In the 2000s, however, virtually all of Lucent’s 3G revenues would 
come from CDMA2000. Its failure to commercialize UMTS products ultimately cost it 
markets in Europe and Asia. 
• Support Businesses:  
 
Microelectronics. Initially this unit designed and manufactured advanced integrated 
circuits, optical devices, and power supplies. Eventually, power supplies would reach 
commodity status, and were transferred to the Network Products Unit. The supplier 
relationship between Microelectronics and Lucent product units became similar to that 
which developed between AT&T Technologies and the RBOCs. There was intense 
pressure for price reduction and additional supplier concessions. Microelectronics sought 
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to satisfy these demands for its internal customers while expanding its customer base to 
external telecommunications equipment companies. Lucent increased its external sales of 
microelectronics products from $2,214 million in 1997 to $3,726 million in 2000, in part 
through a number of acquisitions. The Lucent product units treated the Microelectronics 
unit like any other supplier. Without a collaborative business relationship, Lucent derived 
no competitive advantage from having an internal components supplier. In July 2000 
Lucent made the decision to spin off Microelectronics in order to position it better to 
compete for external customers (Ladendorf 2000). In April 2001 Microelectronics was 
spun off in an IPO to form Agere (the same spelling but different pronunciation of a 
startup that Lucent had acquired a year earlier), with Lucent giving up control of the 
spinoff in June 2002 through a tax-free distribution to Lucent shareholders of the Agere 
shares that it held.  
 
Business Communications Systems
 
. Initially this unit offered Private Business Exchange 
(PBX) systems, communications terminals and switching systems for enterprises. 
Through acquisitions, it expanded its capability in data networks and network software 
applications, both of which would eventually become key business areas for Lucent. In 
2000 this unit was spun off as Avaya as part of Lucent’s strategy of ridding itself of 
“slower-growing” business units (Fisher 2000). After the telecommunications decline of 
the early 2000s, Lucent realized that enterprise and other private networks presented key 
opportunities for growth. It could not capitalize on these opportunities, however, without 
first rebuilding capabilities that it had lost with the Business Communications spin-off.  
With the limited resources available to it at that time, however, Lucent was unable to 
make the necessary investments.   
Network Products
 
. This unit produced fiber optic cable, and eventually would design and 
manufacture fiber-based optical subassemblies. It would produce power units, a business 
transferred from Microelectronics that would be sold to Tyco International in December 
2000. When service providers were rapidly replacing copper cable with fiber, this unit 
provided Lucent with a competitive advantage, producing advanced fiber optic cable with 
superior signal transport capabilities. When communications networks became saturated 
with optical fiber, this unit became a liability and was sold to Furukawa Electric in 
November 2001.    
All three Support Businesses enabled Lucent to be a full-line supplier of network 
solutions to customers. This ability was a carryover from the AT&T days when Lucent’s 
predecessors were part of a vertically integrated enterprise. But when, in the New 
Economy, these businesses could no longer support levels of revenue and profit that were 
demanded for the company’s growth targets, they became viewed as “non-core” units 
that could be divested from the company.  
 
• New Opportunity Businesses 
 
The reorganization that went into effect on November 1, 1997 aligned Lucent resources 
with key growth areas in the telecommunications market. Through this structure Lucent 
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would attempt not only to capitalize on the products and services it had traditionally 
offered, but also to profit from Lucent’s intellectual property.  
 
Intellectual Property Group
 
. Along with issuing licenses for use of Lucent patents, this 
group aggressively pursued patent infringements to generate “revenue”. As a regulated 
monopoly, the Bell System had viewed its inventions as public property that should be 
diffused to other companies and industries. This perspective was clearly articulated in the 
1956 consent decree. As a competitive company, Lucent believed that a significant 
amount of income could be obtained from the licensing of intellectual property and the 
aggressive pursuit of infringement.  Yet, in the years 2003-2005, Lucent generated a total 
of only $387 million, or 1.4 percent of its revenues, from patent licensing. 
New Ventures Group
 
. Following a trend at the time, Lucent also formed new businesses 
based on innovative product or service ideas generated internally. The New Ventures 
Group was directly linked to Bell Labs. During its time with Lucent, the Group 
distributed at least $250 million to 32 new ventures (Tenorio 2002a). In January 2002, 
however, with Lucent facing financial collapse, 80 percent of the Group was sold to 
Coller Capital, a London-based equity management company, for $100 million (Tenorio 
2002a and 2002b). 
Data Networking Systems
 
. Just as with the Wireless Group, in forming this business unit 
Lucent acknowledged that data networking was a business that required additional 
investment. Lucent had very limited expertise in data networking; therefore, most of the 
new product developments in this area came from acquisitions. Between May 1998 and 
July 2000, Lucent did 11 data networking acquisitions for $25.7 billion; although just one 
of these acquisitions, Ascend, cost Lucent $21.4 billion, paid in stock. There was a hope 
within Lucent that this unit would become a formable competitor to Cisco Systems.  
Throughout Lucent’s lifespan, however, Data Networking struggled to establish itself in 
the marketplace.   
• Software and Services: 
 
This category represented businesses that were projected to take Lucent to higher levels 
of profitability. There was a belief among key Lucent executives that the company was 
too “hardware centric”.  While hardware sales generated high revenues, the margins were 
generally low.  A shift to software and services was expected to increase profit because of 
the higher margins that could be attained.  
 
It was believed that these higher margins would, in turn, help drive continuous stock-
price appreciation. Yet in its 127-year “prehistory”, Lucent had been totally in the 
hardware business. As it turned out, with the telecommunications industry in decline after 
2000 (and Lucent’s stock price in the tank as well), it became essential for Lucent to 
expand in Software and Services. Given its dire financial condition, these businesses 
were the only low-overhead options that the company had left to pursue. Services came 
to generate a growing proportion of Lucent’s revenues, exceeding 20 percent from 2001 
and peaking at over 26 percent in 2006. Unfortunately, however, with Lucent’s total 
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revenues in 2006 only 41 percent of the 2001 level, Lucent’s Services sales of $2.3 
billion in 2006 were $1.9 billion less than five years earlier. 
 
Communications Software
 
. The idea of selling software as an end product entailed a 
major cultural shift for Lucent. The company had always viewed software as an integral 
part of hardware that was necessary to make the equipment work. It took some time 
before people at Lucent became comfortable with the business of selling software as a 
revenue generating product on its own. Yet as telecommunications equipment became 
increasingly software-based, the sale of generic software upgrades for systems operation 
and applications represented an increasingly important high-margin revenue stream.  
Global Service Provider Business
 
. This business unit was created in an attempt to provide 
a single Lucent interface to customers. Marketing and sales from the various product 
units were centralized, and the newly formed business unit was assigned profit and loss 
responsibility. The formation of the Global Service Provider Business was Lucent’s way 
of signaling to customers that it was selling complete network solutions, not just “boxes”. 
Lucent product units would no longer compete against each other for sales of products 
with overlapping capabilities to the same customer. In addition to selling systems, this 
unit would sell software and services to communications services companies. At times, 
products from other companies would be sold to fulfill the requirements of a contract.  
In November 1997 Carly Fiorina, who less than two years later would leave Lucent to 
become the CEO of Hewlett-Packard, became the first President of this group. In October 
1999, shortly after her departure, Lucent announced another reorganization. The existing 
product and service units were reconfigured into four core business units: Service 
Provider Networks, Enterprise Networks, NetCare Professional Services, and 
Microelectronics & Communications Technologies. The Global Service Provider 
Business was disbanded; marketing and sales was redistributed back into the four core 
business units. 
 
Lucent’s expansion in the Internet boom 
 
The new competitive environment required a cultural change at Bell Labs. Decisions to 
invest in new technology had to be based on anticipated market demand and networking 
trends, rather than on “protecting” existing technologies or platforms by extending their 
useful lives through customization and adding exotic features.  In making these decisions, 
Lucent executives had to adopt a business mindset rather than a science mindset. Bell 
Labs needed to create a portfolio of advanced technology products without investing in 
“too much technology” to avoid putting timely product introduction at risk. 
 
To mobilize employees for facing the challenge of creating a competitive, fast-paced 
technology-driven company out of a 127-year-old startup, a company-wide initiative was 
launched known as “Lucent GROWS”, with each letter in the acronym representing a 
critical behavior or goal.   
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o Global Growth Mindset: Increase revenue to the extent that Lucent is taking market 
share away from competitors worldwide. 
o Results Focused: Drive to achieve measurable results and meet pre-established goals 
in all tasks or activities. 
o Obsessed With Customers and About Competitors: Develop the kind of relationship 
with new global customers that had already been established with AT&T and the 
RBOCs, but do so in a few years rather than 100 years.  
o Workplace that is Open, Supportive, and Diverse: A recognition that an open and 
supportive environment is necessary to nurture risk-taking, not punish failure, and 
encourage honest, non-threatening communications among employees at all levels. 
Diversity was a priority not only for demonstrating a commitment to equal 
opportunity, but also as a way to attract high-quality people to Lucent who ultimately 
would become the “change agents” of the company. 
o Speed: Hitting market windows on time is important; exceeding customer service 
expectations is important.  All employees must act in a timely and responsive manner.  
 
Lucent GROWS was an effective initiative in aligning employees with the new “mode of 
operation” that was required for the company to compete successfully in the new 
business environment. It was an effective motivational campaign for the first two years of 
the company as revenues continued to increase, the value of employee stock options 
escalated, and Lucent was the market leader in several sectors.   
 
As a newly independent supplier of communications equipment in the new world of 
deregulated telecommunications markets, Lucent faced three immediate challenges. 
   
1. The company had to restructure itself from a vertically integrated, full-line 
supplier of telecommunications equipment into a highly competitive, more agile 
company focused on the most profitable segments of the rapidly evolving ICT 
industry – a company that could not only compete on the quality of its technology 
and service but also on price and time-to-market. 
   
2. Lucent had to diversify its customer base both domestically and internationally, so 
that it was less dependent on revenues from sales to its established customers, 
AT&T and the RBOCs. 
   
3. Lucent had to utilize the R&D capabilities of Bell Labs to create the technologies 
and products necessary for next-generation telecommunications networks, or, 
alternatively, gain access to those technologies and products through acquisitions.  
 
In the Internet boom Lucent was moderately successful in meeting these challenges; it 
grew rapidly as revenues increased at a compound rate of over 17 percent per year from 
1995 through 1999, when it reached sales of $38.3 billion. As can be seen in Table 1, the 
core of Lucent’s business as it began as an independent company was Systems for 
Networks Operators, which grew from $10.6 billion in revenues in 1995, when the 
company was still part of AT&T, to $23.6 billion just four years later.   
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Lucent had inherited the four segments shown in Table 1 from AT&T. Some of these 
technologies and products were, however, approaching “commodity status”, and were no 
longer competitive, especially if premium pricing was necessary for profitability within 
the Lucent structure. In October 1997 Lucent spun off its Consumer Products business, 
which mainly manufactured wireline and wireless telephones, by setting up a joint 
venture with Philips in which Lucent had a 40 percent share (Lucent Technologies 10-K
 
, 
1998, 2).  A year later, the joint venture was disbanded, and Lucent sold off its consumer 
product assets, thus turning itself exclusively into a business-to-business company. 
Table 2 shows the distribution of Lucent’s product and services revenues according to a 
breakdown it adopted in 2000 (Lucent Technologies 10-K 2000
 
, 73). In the boom years 
of 1998-2000, wireless products, which were emerging as growth opportunities, 
represented 15 percent of the company’s revenues by 2000. In its 2000 10-K filing, 
Lucent did not include the revenues for its Enterprise Networks division because it was 
spun off as Avaya on September 30, 2000, the last day of fiscal year 2000. Obviously, 
however, these Enterprise Networks revenues, net income, and employees were part of 
Lucent’s operations for fiscal 2000, and we have therefore included these Enterprise 
Networks data in Figures 1 and 2 above as well as in Table 2 below. 
Table 1:  Lucent revenues by reportable segments, 1995-1999 
 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 
Total revenues, $m 20,258 23,286 26,360 30,147 38,303 
Percent of total           
Systems for Network Operators 52.3 56.7 59.2 62.2 61.5 
Business Communications Systems 25.2 23.7 24.3 26.8 22.3 
Microelectronics Products 9.0 9.9 10.5 10.0 14.2 
Consumer Products 9.1 6.1 3.8 0.0 0.0 
Other Systems and Products 4.5 3.6 2.2 0.9 2.0 
Notes: In 1999 Systems for Network Operators was renamed Service Provider Networks, Business 
Communications Systems was renamed Enterprise Networks, and Microelectronics Products became 
Microelectronics and Communications Products.  
 In 1999 Lucent restated its 1997 and 1998 revenues and costs to take into account “pooling-of-interests” 
mergers with Ascend and Kenan Systems.  Restated revenues were $27.611 billion in 1997 and $31.806 
billion in 1998. 
 In 1995-1997 Other Systems and Products included custom designed defense systems for the US 
government. 
Source: Lucent Technologies 10-K filings, 1996-1998. 
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Table 2. Lucent’s revenues by major product groups, 1998-2000 
  1998 1999 2000 
Total revenues, $m 32,121 38,885 41,493 
Percent of total      
Core Networking Systems 46.6 47.1 45.8 
Wireless Products 13.9 14.2 15.0 
Enterprise Networks 24.1 21.3 18.5 
Microelectronics 7.5 7.2 9.0 
NetCare Professional Services 2.0 2.8 3.0 
Other 5.9 7.4 8.7 
Note: “Other” principally includes optical fiber, power systems, and consumer products 
Source: Lucent Technologies 10-K filing, 2000 ; Avaya 10-K filing, 2000.  
 
In producing these goods and services, Lucent had to diversify its customer base. Even 
after the breakup of the Bell System in January 1984, AT&T and the RBOCs had 
remained the primary customers of AT&T Technologies. Throughout its existence 
Lucent also relied heavily on these customers for revenues. For example, from 1996 to 
1999 the installed base of local access lines that connected to Lucent equipment increased 
from 110 million to 150 million in 1999, primarily through sales to RBOCs. Helping to 
drive the demand for more local access lines in this period was the practice in households 
and businesses of having a second telephone line dedicated to Internet access. 
 
In their financial statements, companies must report the names of companies that make 
up 10 percent or more of their revenues. From 1996 through 1999, AT&T was the only 
company so reported, accounting for a peak of over 14 percent of Lucent’s revenues in 
1997. In 2000, when AT&T represented 10 percent of Lucent’s revenues, Verizon 
(formed when the RBOC Bell Atlantic merged with GTE) had surpassed it, accounting 
for 13 percent. The importance of Verizon as a Lucent customer increased in the 2000s, 
reaching 27 percent of total revenues in 2004 and 28 percent in both 2005 and 2006.   
 
In the new competitive environment of the last half of the 1990s AT&T and the RBOCs 
were themselves seeking to identify alternative suppliers so that they would not be solely 
dependent on a “single source” and so that they could use price competition to boost 
margins and profits. The ability of these customers to choose among suppliers was 
enhanced by the emergence of industry standards, such as the SONET and SDH digital 
transmission standards, as well as by the rapid rate of technological change. At first 
Lucent had an “incumbent” advantage because of the existence of a huge embedded base 
of its equipment, but the emergence of innovative competitors using new lightwave 
technology to build “carrier grade” optical networking equipment during the last half of 
the 1990s caused Lucent’s incumbent advantage to erode.   
 
In response, Lucent itself aggressively sought new customers, focusing on service 
providers planning new optical networks and wireless infrastructure installations or 
“next-generation” service providers, such as Sprint PCS, Winstar, and Global Crossing 
among many others, that were planning new types of service offerings. Some of these 
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companies (such as Winstar and Global Crossing) went bankrupt at the end of the boom.  
Others such as Sprint PCS, however, remained important Lucent customers. Sprint 
represented 15 percent of Lucent revenues in 2003, 11 percent in 2004, and 12 percent in 
2005. 
 
At the same time, Lucent made a push into non-US markets that increased non-US sales 
from $6.7 billion in 1997 to $12.2 billion in 1999. As a result, non-US sales as a 
proportion of total company sales rose from 26 percent to 32 percent (see Table 3).   
When non-US sales declined to $11.2 billion in 2000, US sales declined even more, so 
that non-US sales rose to almost 34 percent of the total. As can be seen in Table 3, the 
most significant expansion of non-US sales from 1997 to 1999 was to EMEA, although 
sales to this region declined in 2000 while sales to other non-US regions were stable or 
rose. Table 4 shows that most of the increase in non-US revenues from 1997 to 
1999/2000 was in Service Provider Networks, although the Enterprise Networks group 
(which would be spun off as Avaya in 2000) and MCT (which would be spun off as 
Agere in 2001) also generated substantial increases in non-US sales during the Internet 
boom. 
 
Table 3. Lucent Technologies’ non-US sales, 1997-2000 
CAN=Canada; CLA=Caribbean/Latin America; EMEA=Europe/Middle East/Africa; AP=Asia Pacific 
Note: Data for 2000 do not include sales by Enterprise Networks, spun off as Avaya on September 30, 2000. 
Source: Lucent Technologies 10-K filings, 1997-2000 
  
Table 4: Lucent’s non-US sales, by reportable segments, 1997-2000 
SPN=Service Provider Networks; EN=Enterprise Networks; MCT=Microelectronics and Communications 
Technologies 
Note: We treat Avaya revenues for 2000 as Lucent revenues, using the data on US and foreign revenues in 
Avaya 10-K filing, 2000, 75. 
1  Includes sales of SPN, EN, and MCT; excludes “other”. Sales for 1997 and 1998 are restated from 1999, 
and therefore the percentage in this column differ what from the analogous percentages in Table 3. 
Source: Lucent Technologies 10-K filings, 1997-2000 
  
 
 
CAN 
$m 
 
 
 
CLA 
$m 
 
 
 
EMEA 
$m 
 
 
 
AP 
$m 
non-US 
sales as 
%  of 
Lucent 
sales 
 
% of 
non-US  
sales in 
CAN 
 
% of 
non-US  
sales in 
CLA 
 
% of 
non-US  
sales in 
EMEA 
 
% of 
non-US  
sales in 
AP 
1997 100 700 3,000 2,800 25.6 1.5 10.6 45.5 42.4 
1998 500 900 3,900 3,000 27.5 6.0 10.8 47.0 36.1 
1999 400 1,500 6,800 3,500 31.8 3.3 12.3 55.7 28.7 
2000 400 1,700 5,300 4,000 33.9 3.5 14.9 46.5 35.1 
 Non-US Sales, $m Non-US sales as percent of 
  
Lucent 
 
SPN 
 
EN 
 
MCT 
Lucent 
sales1 
SPN 
sales 
EN 
sales 
MCT 
sales 
1997 6,747 4,044 995 1,708 25.8 25.8 15.9 40.3 
1998 8,291 4,892 1,511 1,888 26.2 25.6 19.0 40.8 
1999 12,186 8,058 1,763 2,365 32.5 34.2 20.6 43.6 
2000 13,097 8,642 1, 625 2,830 31.6 32.6 21.2 40.7 
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Development of Lucent’s technological capabilities 
 
In the highly competitive environment in which Lucent found itself, it was necessary not 
only to deliver products to the marketplace with superior quality and price performance 
but also to hit market widows-of-opportunity on time with technical innovations. Under 
the system inherited from AT&T, competing on quality was Lucent’s strength, but cost 
and time-to-market were its weaknesses. The possession of Bell Labs contributed to 
Lucent’s quality advantage, but, given the rapidity of technological change from the mid-
1990s, if advanced products were not available on time, the introduction  of higher 
quality products through “Bell Labs Innovation” would not generate anticipated revenues 
or profits.   
 
From the start, Lucent Technologies emphasized the role that Bell Labs could play in its 
efforts to compete as an independent company (see Baker et al. 2000).  Indeed, as shown 
in Figure 5, “Bell Labs Innovation” was part of the company’s logo. 
 
Figure 5. Lucent Technologies logo 
 
 
As a distinguished corporate research organization in the United States, Bell Labs 
positioned Lucent high up among the list of leading patent-generating companies in the 
nation (see Table 5). After the breakup of the Bell System, patents generated at Bell Labs 
placed AT&T anywhere from 9th (in 1985) to 19th (in 1989) among the US patent leaders. 
In each of the two years prior to the Lucent spinoff, AT&T ranked 13th. As an 
independent company, Lucent moved up the ranking from 12th in 1996 to 5th in 2000, at 
which time only IBM, NEC, Canon, and Samsung surpassed it.  
       
 Table 5.  Lucent Technologies, US patents, US rank, and R&D expenditures, 
1996-2006 
 US patents US rank R&D expenses, 
$m 
R&D as % of 
sales 
1996 799 12 2,551 11.0 
1997 768 11 4,047 15.4 
1998 928 13 5,094 16.9 
1999 1,152 9 4,792 12.5 
2000 1,411 5 5,023 14.9 
2001 1,109 12 3,520 16.5 
2002 662 24 2,310 18.7 
2003 621 27 1,488 17.6 
2004 534 35 1,284 14.2 
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2005 405 42 1,177 12.5 
2006 552 37 1,189 13.5 
Source: Intellectual Property Owners website: www.ipo.com 
 
From 1996 to 1998, Lucent doubled its R&D expenditures to $5.1 billion, and raised 
R&D as a percent of sales from 11.0 to 16.9. This level of R&D expenditure was more or 
less sustained over the next two years, but, with declining revenues was cut back 
drastically from 2001 to 2003. With these cuts in R&D, Lucent’s patent output also 
declined; its rank among patent producers in the United States plunged from 5th in 2000 
to 42nd in 2005. During these years, by comparison, IBM maintained its position at the 
number 1 patent producer in the United States. 
 
The products developed internally using Bell Labs resources were typically within the 
three major business units of the company:  Switching Systems, Transmission Systems, 
and Wireless Networks (see Baker et al. 2000).  
 
In Switching Systems, efforts concentrated on software upgrades to the 5ESS Central 
Office Digital Switch. Lucent’s “incumbent” advantage depended critically on sales of 
these upgrades for the switches imbedded in the public circuit switch network. As packet 
switching began to compete with circuit switching, significant development was focused 
on creating “soft switch”, a switching system that provides routing of traffic more 
through software algorithms than by redirecting through hardware paths. As a result, this 
business unit, that at one point was a leader in switching hardware technology, became 
highly dependent upon software creation. 
 
In Transmission Systems, efforts concentrated on products that would create the “all 
optical network”. Optical products were characterized by two properties: the number of 
channels, or wavelengths, that the system would support through a single optical fiber; 
and the speed at which signals could be transported over each of these channels. The 
number of channels that can be carried on a single fiber is increased utilizing Wave 
Division Multiplex (WDM) technology. Bell Labs developed a progression of optical 
transport systems that supported 16, 40, and 80 wavelengths per optical fiber. The 40 and 
80 wavelength products were designed to use Dense Wavelength Division Multiplex 
(DWDM) technology.  
 
Bell Labs gave Lucent considerable in-house knowledge of optical networking 
technology. For the period 1996-2002, 2,372 (35 percent) of Lucent’s 6,829 US patents 
related to optical, compared with 626 (29 percent) of 2,123 for Nortel, 854 (40 percent) 
of 2,102 for Alcatel, and 160 (25 percent) of 643 for Cisco (United States Patent and 
Trademark Office 2009). Yet in 1999 Nortel’s optical networking revenues were $4.0 
billion compared with Lucent’s $3.6 billion; and in 2000, Nortel’s optical networking 
revenues soared by 133 percent to $9.2 billion while Lucent’s actually fell by 7 percent to 
$3.3 billion. John Chambers, CEO of Cisco, said that in optical networking his 
company’s main competitor was Nortel, not Lucent (Egbert 2000).   
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In Wireless Networks, Bell Labs had much work to do. Wireless transmission was a new 
technology that was growing, and Lucent did not have an imbedded base of products in 
this area that it could leverage or modify into “next generation” product offerings. The 
major product in wireless networks was the base station. These systems were designed 
for two types of wireless networks. In the earlier days of mobile communications, the 
network was based on 2G (second generation) technology. These networks provided 
basic voice communications. In the 2000s the wireless network began migrating toward 
3G (third generation) technology. These networks provide remote access to “Internet-
like” service such as voice, data, and video.   
 
In designing base stations, decisions needed to be made regarding the transmission 
standard that would be used. The selection was complicated by the fact that a greater 
variety of standards had evolved in wireless communications than in wireline 
communications. No single standard was proving to be dominant; Lucent needed to 
determine in which of the alternatives it would risk investing. Lucent selected Code 
Division Multiplex Access (CDMA) and Universal Mobile Telecommunications Systems 
(UMTS). Lucent did not elect to invest in Global Systems for Mobile Communication 
(GSM) which was a 2G system used throughout the world. As GSM networks eventually 
migrated to 3G technology, Lucent anticipated that UMTS or a derivative, W-CDMA 
(Wideband Code Division Multiplex Access), would be the technology adopted. As we 
shall see, however, in the first half of the 2000s, notwithstanding its early success in sales 
of 3G networks based on CDMA2000 technology, Lucent failed in its efforts to 
commercialize 3G networks based on UMTS. 
 
Lucent’s acquisitions 
 
Given the growth of optical and wireless technologies as well as the convergence of 
voice, data, and video, during the last half of the 1990s the major telecommunications 
equipment companies looked to acquisitions to fill critical gaps in their product portfolios 
as well as to give them instant access to new customers bent on investing in next-
generation technologies. Old Economy companies like Lucent, Nortel, Alcatel, and 
Ericsson watched Cisco Systems use a growth-through-acquisition strategy to dominate 
the enterprise networking market and make inroads into the carrier markets. Founded in 
1984, Cisco went public in 1990 with about $70 million in sales and 200 employees. It 
did its first acquisition in 1993, and by the end of 1998 had done 29 more, for which it 
paid a total of over $8.4 billion, 94 percent of which took the form of Cisco’s own stock.  
By that time the upstart had $8.4 billion in revenues and 15,000 employees. But Cisco 
was just beginning: in 1999 and 2000, it did 41 acquisitions for $26.7 billion, over 99 
percent paid with its high-flying stock (Carpenter et al. 2003).   
 
The perceived need to compete for acquisitions became a “strategic” justification for 
keeping stock prices high. This in turn demanded meeting or exceeding quarterly revenue 
and earnings targets, objectives with which Lucent top executives, led by the hard-driving 
McGinn, became obsessed (see Endlich 2004). Table 6 shows the value of the 
acquisitions made by Lucent, Nortel, Alcatel, and Cisco in 1997-2000, and the extent to 
which they were purchased with stock. 
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Table 6. Market Value of Acquisitions, Acquisition Share, and Mode of Payment, 
Nortel, Lucent, Alcatel, and Cisco, 1997-2000 
                         
 Nortel (NT) Lucent 
(LU) 
Alcatel 
(ALA) 
Cisco 
(CSCO) 
NT+LU+ALA 
+CSCO 
Value of acquisitions ($m)      
1997 430 2,635 0 586 3,651 
1998 8,390 2,416 5,000 1,114 16,920 
1999 6,452 32,003 4,124 14,435 57,014 
2000 14,395 9,996 7,233 12,254 43,878 
1997-2000 29,667 47,049 16,357 28,389 121,463 
Percent of total acquisitions 
by value 
     
1997 11.8 72.2 0.0 16.1 100.0 
1998 49.6 14.3 29.6 6.6 100.0 
1999 11.3 56.1 7.2 25.3 100.0 
2000 32.8 22.8 16.5 27.9 100.0 
Percent of value acquired 
with stock 
     
1997 63.7 30.7 0.0 70.9 41.1 
1998 98.2 38.0 93.7 84.9 87.4 
1999 88.0 99.2 43.0 99.8 95.1 
2000 99.8 97.6 97.6 98.8 98.7 
Notes: a) Under accounting rules governing spinoffs, Lucent was not allowed to use pooling-of-interests accounting 
until October 1998, which reduced its incentive to use stock as the acquisition currency prior to that time. 
b) Lucent’s acquisition costs not disclosed (employees in parentheses): 1997, Triple C Call Center (18); 1998, Pario 
Software (4), TKM Communications (45); 1999, Soundlogic CTI (22), CCOM Information Systems (10).  Lucent’s 
1998 figures include the acquisition of Stratus by Ascend ($917 million in stock, 65 employees), and 1999 figures 
include the acquisition of XNT Systems and Quantum Telecom Solutions by Excel Switching.  
c) Cisco’s acquisition cost of Telesend (10 employees) in 1997 not disclosed 
Sources:   Carpenter et al. 2003.  Compiled from company annual reports and press releases.  Wherever possible, the 
value of the deal at closing rather than at announcement has been used. 
 
Between October 1996 and September 2006, Lucent made 41 acquisitions. Table 7 shows 
the distribution of acquisitions by year and business area, while Table 8 shows the 
distribution of acquisitions among the Lucent business areas in terms of the number of 
acquisitions, the value paid for them, and the number of people employed by the target at 
the time it was acquired. Of Lucent’s 41 acquisitions, 31 were made in 1999-2000 
representing 92 percent of the total value paid and 76 percent of the total employees. 
Ascend was by far the most expensive acquisition, accounting for 46 percent of the value 
that Lucent paid for 36 acquisitions in 1997-2000. The 371 million Lucent shares 
expended to acquire Ascend represented 13.5 percent of all Lucent common shares 
outstanding. Overall Lucent used almost 23 percent of its stock to make acquisitions over 
the decade of its existence. In terms of cost per employee of the acquired company, the 
five most expensive acquisitions (highlighted in Table 8) were Chromatis ($29.7 million), 
Spring Tide ($10.1 million), Nexabit ($7.4 million), Ascend ($7.1 million), and Ortel 
($5.5 million). The first three companies in this list were founded in either 1997 or 1998. 
As shown in Table 8, the most active business areas for making acquisitions were Data 
Networking, Enterprise Networks, and Microelectronics. 
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Table 7. Lucent Technologies’ acquisitions by business area, 1996-2006 
 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 
Enterprise Networks 1 3 1 3        
Enterprise Services  1 1         
Microelectronics   2 3 4       
Data Networks   6 3 2    1  1 
Global Services   1 1        
Communications Software    1       1 
Switching Systems    1        
Optical Systems     2       
New Ventures Group     1 1      
Total 1 4 11 12 9 1 0 0 1 0 2 
 
 
Data Networking 
Lucent’s Data Networking acquisitions took place predominantly between 1998 and 2000 
(with only two being made outside these years, one in 2004 and the other in 2006).  
These moves were targeted at packet switch technology that could be used with Local 
Areas Networks (LANs) or Wide Area Networks (WANs).3
 
 Initially Lucent invested in 
companies utilizing Asynchronous Transfer Mode (ATM) technology, which was viewed 
as a competitor to Internet Protocol (IP), the technology championed by Cisco for packet 
transport.   
In 1999 Lucent began to shift its strategy by acquiring companies with IP expertise and 
products that could offer Voice over Internet Protocol (VoIP) capability. The shift toward 
IP was an admission by Lucent that it had made a huge error in judgment and investment, 
by attempting to compete against Cisco by developing ATM products as an alternative to 
IP packet transport. ATM products had been developed in both the switching and 
transmission portfolios with very little success.  Now these products would need to be re-
engineered to accommodate IP-based signals, or in some cases completely discarded.
                                                 
3  A Local Area Network (LAN) connects devices over a relatively short distance, such as within an office 
building or between buildings in a small campus. A Wide Area Network (WAN) spans a larger 
geographic area such as a state or a country; WANS are formed by interconnecting multiple smaller 
networks, such as a group of LANs or metropolitan areas networks (MANs). 
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Table 8: Characteristics and costs of Lucent Technologies’ acquisitions, 1996-2006 
Notes: YF means year founded; AC, acquisition cost; MP, mode of payment; %LU, % of Lucent outstanding 
common stock used for acquisition; AE, acquisition employees; C/AE, cost of the acquisition per acquisition 
employee. 
Sources: Company filings and press releases, and assorted news sources. 
 
 
 
 
Date  
acquired 
Lucent business unit/ 
Company acquired 
Location YF AC 
$m 
MP %LU AE 
$m 
C/AE 
 Enterprise Networks, Business Communications       
10/8/96 Agile Networks    Boxborough, MA 1991 100 cash  60 1.67 
7/17/97 Octel Communications   Milpitas, CA 1982 1,825 cash  2,900 0.63 
10/15/97 Livingston Enterprises    Pleasanton, CA 1986 610 stock 1.20 200 3.05 
12/10/97 Prominet    Marlborough, CA 1996 200 stock 0.39 85 2.35 
6/8/98 SDX Business Systems    Hertfordshire, UK 1991 207 cash  340 0.61 
4/5/99 Mosaix   Redmond, WA 1983 129 stock 0.09 550 0.24 
7/1/99 CCOM Information Systems    Iselin, NJ 1989 ND cash  10 NA 
12/15/99 Soundlogic CTI Vancouver, BC        22 0.00 
 Enterprise Networks Professional Services       
5/19/97 Triple C Call Center Comm. Frankfurt, Germany 1994 ND stock NA 18 NA 
3/11/98 TKM Communications   Toronto, ON 1988 ND cash  45 NA 
 Microelectronics        
4/6/98 Chip Express Corp    Santa Clara, CA 1989 10 cash  130 0.08 
4/19/98 Optimay    Munich, Germany 1987 64 cash  60 1.07 
2/22/99 Sybarus Technologies    Ottawa, ON 1997 41 cash  35 1.17 
3/2/99 Enable Ethernet    San Jose, CA 1995 51 cash  40 1.28 
7/15/99 SpecTran Sturbridge, MA 1981 68 cash  500 0.14 
1/20/00 Agere    Austin, TX 1998 377 stock 0.25 90 4.19 
2/4/00 VTC    Bloomington, MN 1984 104 cash  230 0.45 
2/7/00 Ortel   Alhambra, CA 1980 2,998 stock 1.63 550 5.45 
6/19/00 Herrmann Technology    Dallas, TX 1994 432 stock 0.22 260 1.66 
 Data Networking, Internetworking Systems       
4/27/98 Yurie Systems   Landover, MD 1992 1,044 cash  250 4.18 
7/9/98 Lannet Data Communications    Tel Aviv, Israel 1985 115 cash  500 0.23 
7/28/98 MassMedia Communications Natick, MA 1995 0 cash  12 0.00 
10/6/98 Quadritek Systems   Malvern, PA 1993 50 cash  70 0.71 
11/24/98 Pario Software     Redwood City, CA 1997 ND cash  4 NA 
11/25/98 WaveAccess   Ra'anana, Israel 1993 56 cash  65 0.86 
1/13/99 Ascend Communications Alameda, CA 1989 21,423 stock 13.45 3,000 7.14 
6/25/99 Nexabit Networks Malborough, MA 1997 896 stock 0.47 120 7.47 
8/13/99 Xedia Corp    Action, MA 1993 246 stock 0.23 90 2.73 
3/13/00 DeltaKabel TeleCom  Gouda, Netherlands 1973 52 cash  60 0.87 
7/25/00 Spring Tide Networks    Maynard, MA 1998 1,315 stock 0.81 130 10.12 
8/20/04 Telica Marlborough, MA 1998 295 stock 1.83 251 1.18 
3/21/06 Riverstone Santa Clara, CA 1997 207 cash  550 0.38 
 Communications Software        
1/11/99 Kenan Systems  Cambridge, MA 1982 1,484 stock 0.94 750 1.98 
9/12/06 Mobiltec San Mateo, CA 2000 ND cash    NA 
 New Ventures Group        
7/12/00 USA Digital Radio   Columbia, MD 1990      46 NA 
6/5/01 MetroCommute.com    New York, NY 1994   cash    NA 
 Optical Networking        
3/15/00 Ignitus Communications  Acton, MA 1999 106 cash  75 1.41 
5/31/00 Chromatis Networks    Hendron, VA 1997 4,756 stock 2.38 160 29.73 
 Network Switching Systems        
8/18/99 Excel Switching    Hyannis, MA 1988 1,723 stock 0.73 460 3.75 
 Global Professional Services        
7/20/98 JNA Telecommunications    Sydney, Australia 1960 67 cash  240 0.28 
8/10/99 International Network Serv.   Sunnyvale, CA 1991 3,284 stock 1.63 2,200 1.49 
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Enterprise Networks 
When developing equipment for the packet-switched public network, Lucent focused on 
ATM technology. When developing equipment for LANs used by companies, however, it 
needed to develop capability in both IP and Ethernet technologies, which were typically 
used for LANs. Several of the smaller acquisitions helped to reinforce these product 
areas. 
 
Lucent’s first acquisitions were for the company’s Business Communications Services 
group, which later became known as Enterprise Networks. Most acquisitions for this unit 
occurred between 1996 and 1999. The strategies within this Business Unit were a 
preview of what Lucent would pursue as a company in the future. Acquisitions were 
made to support packet switching applications in LANs. Initially ATM technology was 
pursued, but eventually IP and Ethernet technology became the focus. Software products 
that would manage multimedia data flow were of interest along with VoIP capabilities 
over LANs. An integrated product and service offering provided by Lucent was Call 
Center design and installation. Various software company acquisitions were made to 
enhance the features and capabilities of this offering.  In addition, Lucent’s expertise in 
providing professional network services to businesses was strengthened by several 
acquisitions. This cluster of business services eventually became known as NetCare 
Professional Services.   
 
In response to the severe downturn in the telecommunications industry in 2001-2003, 
Lucent needed to focus on packet-based switching systems, routers, applications 
software, and professional services. Unfortunately, the Enterprise Networks business unit 
in which Lucent would have developed these capabilities and products had been spun-off 
as Avaya in September 2000. With the relevant experience and expertise developed 
within the Enterprise Networks unit no longer available to Lucent, the company needed 
to recreate these capabilities in the 2000s. But it lacked the financial resources to make 
new acquisitions as it had done originally to reinforce the ability of Enterprise Networks 
to compete in the new telecommunications environment. 
Microelectronics 
 
Acquisitions for this unit were all made between May 1998 and June 2000. These 
acquisitions rounded out the unit’s product portfolio and positioned it to better meet 
designer requirements for the creation of packet switch and wireless systems. This 
product portfolio included Ethernet and advanced processor chips for routers, and chip-
sets to support the Global System for Mobile Communications (GSM), the European 2G 
standard for wireless communication.   
 
Acquired optical technology capabilities included specialty optical fiber fabrication and 
advanced optical filters utilized to support deployment of Dense Wavelength Division 
Multiplexing (DWDM) technology. An important addition that addressed a growth 
market was Ortel Corporation, which made optical components used to upgrade cable TV 
networks for Internet and telephone services.  
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The Microelectronics unit was spun off by Lucent as Agere Systems with an IPO in April 
2001. Initially Lucent retained voting control, but in June 2002 Lucent distributed its 
Agere shares to Lucent shareholders.  Henceforth, Lucent would gain access to the Agere 
technologies obtained from previous microelectronics acquisitions only as a customer of 
Agere products, just like any other network equipment company. With the conclusion of 
the Agere spin-off, Lucent lost any strategic advantage that it could obtain from the 
microelectronics acquisitions and Bell Labs device research investments that it had made. 
Other Business Unit Acquisitions 
 
Switching Systems and Optical Networks were two business units that were heavily 
supported by internal product development through Bell Labs research and design teams 
residing within the product units. As a result, very little acquisition activity was directed 
at these units. The acquisitions that were made, however, helped to address serious 
competitive challenges that each Business Unit faced. 
 
The most important product in Switching Systems was the 5ESS Switch.  It was created 
to support conventional circuit switch digital networks. As demand for packet switching 
grew, the 5ESS had limited ability to meet these needs. The digital switch needed to be 
replaced with a software-dominated “soft switch”.  The only acquisition for this unit, 
Excel Switching Corporation, brought programmable switching expertise into Lucent so 
that equipment that could bridge circuit and packet networks using IP could be 
developed. 
 
Optical network capacity continued to grow because of the number of deployments and 
technical advances that increased speed and number of wavelength channels per strand of 
fiber. A bottleneck existed in getting customer broadband, or packet switch, traffic from 
business and residences onto the high-speed optical networks to consume this capacity. 
One approach to the bottleneck problem was the development of optical metropolitan, or 
network edge, equipment that would consolidate and direct this traffic onto the high-
capacity network. To perform this function, the equipment needs to be compatible with 
the various protocols found in metropolitan networks: SONET, ATM, and IP. 
Economically, it is best to process all three protocols in one piece of equipment rather 
than use specialized stand-alone units. The Ignitus and Chromatis acquisitions were 
intended to satisfy this need, even though products from each company were still under 
development. As it turned out, Lucent was unable to commercialize any products 
generated from these acquisitions. Indeed, given the dubious circumstances surrounding 
the Chromatis acquisition, which we outline below, it may well have been the case that 
the prime purpose of this $4.8 billion deal, done at the zenith of the Internet boom, was to 
hype Lucent’s languishing stock price or prevent a competitor from acquiring the 
company. 
 
There appears to have been no underlying strategy in the acquisitions for 
Communications Software, New Ventures, and Global Professional Services. One can 
conclude that these acquisitions were made as opportunities presented themselves, the 
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cost of the acquisitions seemed reasonable at the time, and the product or service 
offerings fit well into the “value propositions” of the business unit.   
  
3.  From boom to almost bust 
 
Lucent’s revenue slowdown and decline 
 
Since the creation of Lucent in 1996, the company achieved year over year revenue 
growth on its consolidated operations until 1999. Then revenue declined steadily for the 
next four years. When revenue stabilized after 2003, it was less than 25 percent of the 
peak level reached in 1999. The telecommunications equipment industry as a whole went 
into sharp decline during 2001 and 2002. Growth resumed in the 2004 timeframe but at a 
significantly slower rate than experienced in the late 1990s. To some extent, therefore, 
Lucent’s performance in the 2000s can be attributed to an inhospitable economic 
environment.  To what extent was that the case, and to what extent and in what ways was 
Lucent’s performance the result of strategic missteps or organizational failures?   
 
As we have seen in Figures 1 and 2 at the beginning of this paper, all of the major Old 
Economy communications equipment companies went through wrenching declines when 
the New Economy crashed in 2001 and 2002. Underlying their lower revenues, negative 
incomes, and downsized labor forces was, as shown in Figure 6, a sharp decline in 
expenditures on capital equipment in the telecommunications industry in the United 
States (CAPEX). In 1995-2000, CAPEX grew at annual compounded rate of 23 percent; 
in 2000-2003 it declined at a rate of 28 percent.  In Figure 6 we see from the data on 
Lucent’s revenues from Systems for Network Operators (SNO), on which changes in 
CAPEX had a direct impact, Lucent failed to capture fully the growth of CAPEX in 1999 
and 2000, was adversely affected by the decline in CAPEX in 2001 through 2003, and 
then was unable to participate in the growth of CAPEX from 2004 through 2006. SNO 
revenues reached $26.5 billion in 2000 but declined to $6.3 billion in 2006. Moreover, 
during its decade as an independent company, Lucent became increasingly more 
dependent on SNO sales with the spinoffs of the Consumer Product unit in 1997, the 
Enterprise Networks unit in 2000, and the Microelectronics unit in 2001. SNO revenues 
as a percent of total revenues rose from 56.7 percent in 1996 to a peak of 77.3 percent in 
2004, before declining to 75.9 percent in 2005 and 71.9 percent in 2006. 
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Figure 6. Capital expenditures on telecommunications equipment in the United 
States (US CAPEX) and Lucent Technologies revenues from Systems for 
Network Operators (Lucent SNO) 
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 Sources: US Census Bureau, 1996-2006; Lucent Technologies 10-K filings, 1996-2006 
 
Lucent’s problem in 2000 was that it failed to take advantage of the huge surge in capital 
spending on optical network equipment that marked the last stage of the Internet boom. 
Nortel was able to take advantage of the mammoth optical networking build-out that 
occurred in 2000. Nortel optical revenues increased by 133 percent from 1999 to 2000, 
while during the same period Lucent’s optical revenue declined by 7 percent.  Nortel’s 
$9.2 billion in revenues from optical systems in 2000 were $5.9 billion greater than 
Lucent’s $3.3 billion  
 
In early January 2000, Lucent announced that revenues in the first quarter of fiscal 2000 
had been flat at about $9.8 or $9.9 billion, while its earnings per share had fallen from 48 
cents to 36-39 cents, compared with the first quarter of fiscal 1999 which ended 
December 31, 1999.  In its press release, the company attributed the lower than expected 
revenue and earnings for the first quarter of fiscal 2000 to: 
 
o Faster than anticipated shifts in customers’ purchases to Lucent's newest 80-channel 
DWDM optical product line and greater than expected demand for OC-192 capability 
on the 80-channel systems, which resulted in near-term manufacturing capacity and 
deployment constraints 
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o Changes in implementation plans by a number of customers inside and outside the 
United States, which led to delays in network deployments by enterprises and service 
providers;  
 
o Lower software revenues, reflecting acceleration in the continuing trend by service 
providers to acquire software more evenly throughout the year. In the past, these 
purchases occurred primarily in the quarter ending December 31; 
 
o Lower than anticipated gross margins resulting from ramp-up costs associated with 
introducing and deploying new products along with lower software revenues. 
 
By October 2000, when it was clear that Lucent had failed to take advantage of the 
optical networking boom, CEO McGinn and Executive VP of Corporate Strategy and 
Business Development William O’Shea identified the problem as a missed product cycle 
with OC-192 optical transport equipment (see Arnst 2000; Barbash 2000; Schiesel 2000). 
This explanation was somewhat misleading. Sales of OC-192 equipment only began to 
take off in 2000. AT&T and the RBOCs, which were Lucent’s major customers, were not 
in the forefront of investing in OC-192 optical networking systems in 2000.  Lucent 
executives, therefore, failed to provide an adequate explanation for Nortel’s substantial 
increase in optical networking market share.4
 
  
In failing to take advantage of the optical networking boom of 2000, Lucent achieved 
only modest growth that year. Many of the problems that Lucent experienced in the 
downturn were of its own creation. They were the result of the obsession by Lucent’s top 
executives with recording high rates of growth, quarter after quarter. In early 2001 
Lucent was investigated by the SEC for “channel stuffing”: the booking of sales on 
products shipped that were preceded by private agreements with distributors assuring 
them that they did not have to pay for goods that were not subsequently sold. In 
November 2000, after CEO McGinn was ousted, Lucent revealed that it had improperly 
booked $679 million in revenue during the 2000 fiscal year (Jander 2000a, 2001a).  
While the SEC took no action on this particular admission, in October 2002 it served 
notice on Lucent of a possible civil lawsuit over improper accounting to inflate its sales 
figures in 1999 and 2000 (Loomis 2003).  In November 2000, the company was the target 
of two class action lawsuits from shareholders for the misreporting of 2000 revenues and 
earnings (Johnson 2000b). With Lucent’s stock price in a free fall – in October 2002 
Lucent’s stock price was just 1.5 percent of the value at its peak in December 1999 – the 
number of lawsuits mounted, and in March 2003, the company agreed to an omnibus 
settlement of 54 separate lawsuits for a total of $420 million (PR Newswire 2003). 
 
Another problem that Lucent created for itself in the boom period was excessive vendor 
financing.  It is a common practice in the telecommunications equipment industry for a 
vendor to secure business by offering to finance some of the purchase price. This practice 
involves risk to the vendor if the loan goes bad. In the Internet boom, with its young 
                                                 
4 It is beyond the scope of this paper to provide a complete explanation of the differences between Lucent 
and Nortel in sales of optical networking equipment in the boom. We intend to address this question in a 
future paper. 
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firms and unproven technologies, vendor financing could become very risky indeed. In 
one well-known case Lucent provided vendor financing to WinStar Wireless for purchase 
of Lucent 5ESS switches and related gear to be used in a fixed wireless installation 
(Business Wire 1997a). Given the uncertainties that surrounded the success of WinStar’s 
service – creating a local access network using fixed wireless technology dependent upon 
line-of-sight transmission across roof tops – Lucent was in effect acting as a venture 
capitalist to secure the sale. In the end, Lucent had agreements to provide WinStar with 
up to $2 billion in vendor financing. In 2001 Lucent pulled the financial plug on WinStar 
by refusing to extend a loan of $90 million. After WinStar was forced into bankruptcy, 
Lucent had to write off $700 million in bad debts. At the end of fiscal 2000, Lucent had 
entered into agreements with customers to provide up to $8.1 billion in credit or loan 
guarantees, of which almost $2.1 billion was outstanding.  Lucent made provisions of bad 
debts to customers of $2.2 billion in 2001 and $1.3 billion in 2002. 
 
At the same time, some of Lucent’s most expensive acquisitions made in 1999 and 2000 
turned out to be virtually worthless. Key personal left the acquisitions; their products 
were not successfully developed or integrated into the Lucent portfolio; in some cases 
product offerings overlapped; and all were eventually shut down. In the boom, it 
appeared that the more Lucent paid for an acquisition on a per employee basis, the more 
likely it was that key personnel, enriched by the acquisition and often eager to join 
another startup, would walk out the door. Such was the case at Lucent’s most expensive 
acquisition, Ascend (Endlich 2004, 115-118). Such was not, however, apparently the case 
with another expensive acquisition, Kenan Systems, which cost Lucent almost $1.5 
billion in stock.  Kenan Systems had 750 employees, but not one of them held stock. The 
only stockholder was the CEO, Kenan Sahin, who had founded the company in 1982. In 
January 2002, Kenan Systems was sold for $300 million in cash. 
 
When Lucent acquired Chromatis Systems for almost $4.8 billion in May 2000, it 
estimated that the optical switch for metropolitan area networking which the startup was 
planning to produce would generate revenues of $375 million in 2001 and $1 billion in 
2002, with revenues peaking in 2005. Just prior to the Chromatis acquisition, Lucent had 
completed the purchase of Ignitus for a total of $106 million in cash. Ignitus was a startup 
in which Lucent had previously invested, and was developing technology similar to that 
of Chromatis. With Chromatis in hand, Lucent cancelled further development of the 
Ignitus product. In August 2001 Lucent shuttered the Chromatis operations, which had 
failed to produce a commercial product, and took a $3.7 billion write-off of goodwill 
(Jander 2000b, 2000c, 2001b).  The Spring Tide acquisition made in September 2000 for 
$1.3 billion in stock, as part of Lucent’s effort to build capabilities in IP networking 
equipment, did deliver a product. But Spring Tide was shut down in November 2000, 
leaving Lucent’s books with an impairment charge of $837 million.  
 
In 1999 Lucent’s acquisition of Kenan Systems, Ascend, Mosaix, Nexabit, International 
Network Services, Xedia, and Excel, absorbed 18.0 percent of Lucent’s stock valued at 
$29.2 billion. These acquisitions did not entail subsequent write-downs because they 
were done as “pooling-of-interest” mergers, a much-abused practice that the Financial 
Accounting Standards Board would outlaw in July 2001.  
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Nevertheless, even in 2000, the dilution of shareholdings caused by these expenditures of 
stock was putting downward pressure on earnings per share, and with the downturn in 
2001, things only got worse.   As Lucent’s revenues plunged, and its losses mounted, the 
bond-rating agencies lowered its credit-rating. As shown in Figure 7, the downgrades 
began in December 2000; by August 2001 Lucent’s credit rating was “junk”. Six 
additional downgrades through November 2002 left Lucent with a Moody’s rating of 
Caa1; Moody's gives a Caa rating to “bonds...of poor standing [that] may be in default or 
[for which] there may be present elements of danger with respect to principal or interest” 
(see www.moodys.com). 
 
Figure 7. Moody’s bond ratings of Alcatel, Lucent and Nortel, Nov. 2000-Dec. 2005 
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Note: Obligations rated ‘A’ are to be considered as upper-medium-grade, a ‘Baa’ rating indicates a medium-
grade investment with certain speculative characteristics, ‘Ba’-rated obligations are viewed as more 
speculative again and bonds and preferred stock which are rated ‘B’ generally lack characteristics of the 
desirable investment. Obligations rated ‘Ba3’ and below are considered to have junk bond status.  The 
numbers ‘1, 2 and 3’ are modifiers within these categories.   
 
Sources: www.moody’s.com; Carpenter and Lazonick 2007. 
 
In the decline of 2001-2002, as its financial shortfalls mounted, the stock market became 
an important source of finance to Lucent, mainly because its downgraded bond rating 
made it impossible to issue long-term debt. In August 2001 Lucent did a preferred stock 
issue that netted $1.83 billion, and in March 2002, when its bond rating had been cut for 
the fifth time in 16 months, it did a more complicated deal in which it set up a trust to 
issue preferred securities and then had the trust buy 7.75% convertible subordinated 
debentures from Lucent for a net cash inflow of $1.75 billion.    
 
The irony for a company like Lucent – and it applies to many other US companies that 
experienced financial difficulties in the Internet bust – is that it could have used the 
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speculative stock market of the Internet boom to sell stock on the market to pay off debt 
or augment the corporate treasury (see Carpenter et al. 2003).  After all, US corporations 
had behaved this way in the speculative boom of the late 1920s (O’Sullivan 2004), and, 
in more recent history, major Japanese corporations had sold massive amounts of stock in 
Japan’s “bubble economy” of the late 1980s (see Ide 1998, 83-4; more generally, 
Lazonick 1999). Had it not been for this financial behavior, the adverse impacts on these 
corporations of the subsequent downturns – in the United States in the early 1930s and 
Japan in the early 1990s – would have been far more severe. 
 
Lucent’s decline 2001-2003 
  
In the Internet bust of 2001-2002 all telecommunications equipment companies 
experienced sharp revenue declines, and they all responded by slashing employment (see 
Figure 1 and Figure 2). From 2002 to 2002 Alcatel’s revenues declined by 41 percent, 
Ericsson’s by 42 percent, Nortel’s by 65 percent, and Lucent’s by 70 percent. Clearly, the 
two North American companies, Nortel and Lucent, were much harder hit than the two 
European companies, Alcatel and Ericsson.5
 
  Yet in 2002, Lucent’s revenues were still 17 
percent greater than Nortel’s. In 2003, however, Lucent’s revenues declined another 31 
percent, compared with 9 percent for Alcatel, 2 percent for Ericsson, and 3 percent for 
Nortel.  In 2006 Lucent’s sales were only 77 percent of Nortel’s, 54 percent of Alcatel’s, 
and 36 percent of Ericsson’s.  
As for employment, Lucent reduced its headcount in every year of the 2000s. When it 
merged with Alcatel in December 2006, Lucent had fewer than 30,000 employees, 
roughly 20 percent of the 153,000 people it had at the peak in 1999. Lucent had 100 
percent more employees in 1999 than Nortel, 32 percent more than Alcatel, and 48 
percent more than Ericsson. In 2006 Lucent had 12 percent less employees than Nortel, 
50 percent less than Alcatel, and 53 percent less than Ericsson.   
 
Lucent’s revenues fell from $41.5 billion in 2000 to $8.5 billion in 2003. As it booked 
losses totaling $26.8 billion for this three-year period, the company shed assets and 
employees to stay afloat.  After 2000 Lucent’s revenues went into sharp decline, with the 
wireline business being much harder hit than the wireless business, as is evident in Table 
9.6 Mobility Access & Applications Solutions (MAAS) revenues declined 21 percent 
from $6.8 billion in 2000 to $5.4 billion in 2002, while Integrated Network Solutions 
(INS) plummeted 66 percent from $18.7 billion to $6.4 billion.7
                                                 
5 Contributing to the extraordinary losses in 2001 of Lucent ($14.2 billion) and Nortel ($24.5 billion) were 
write-downs of high-priced acquisitions that the companies had made in 1998-2000.  One reason why 
Nortel’s reported loss was so much greater than Lucent’s was because, as a company based in Canada, it 
had not been able to account for its stock-based acquisitions as “pooling-of-interests”, as Lucent did for 
$29.8 billion in stock-based acquisitions that it made in 1999. 
 
6  In its 2001 financial statements, with total revenues not including Agere at $21.2 billion, Lucent simply 
listed its segments as Products (79.1 percent) and Services (19.5 percent), with Other making up the 
remainder.  
7 From 2000 to 2002, “switching and access’ revenues declined from $10.8 billion to $3.2 billion, “optical 
networking products” from $3.3 billion to $1.4 billion, and “wireless products” from 6.4 billion to $4.5 
billion (Lucent 2002 10-K, 42.). 
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Table 9.  Lucent’s reportable segments, 2000-20021 
  20002 2001 2002 
Total revenues (without optical fiber), $m 27,062 19,271 12,207 
Percent of total      
Mobility Access & Application Solutions 25.3 33.1 44.1 
Integrated Network Solutions 68.9 62.8 52.6 
Other (including intellectual property) 5.8 4.1 3.4 
1 The spinoff of Enterprise Networks as Avaya was completed on September 30, 2000, and Avaya revenues 
were not included in Lucent 2000 reported revenues. In Table 2, which compares revenues in 1998, 
1999, and 2000, we added Enterprise Networks revenues to the 2000 total.  In this table, which looks 
back from 2002, we have omitted Enterprise Networks data from the 2000 total. 
2 Restated to reflect sale of Power Systems business and Agere spinoff in 2001. 
 
The first major disposal of assets came at the end of fiscal 2000 when Lucent spun off its 
Enterprise Networks division as Avaya. In its 2000 Annual Report (p. 4), Lucent stated 
that the purpose of the Avaya spinoff as well as that of the prospective spinoff of its 
microelectronics division as Agere was “to strengthen our focus on the service provider 
market.” Avaya had 2000 revenues of $7.7 billion and 31000 employees worldwide.  
Restating 1999 revenues to reflect the Avaya spinoff, Lucent’s revenues in the year 
ending September 30, 2000 were, at $33,557 million, $3,667 million more than the 
previous year. But, based on the restated figures, gross margins, which had been rising 
steadily from 1996 through 1999, fell from 49.5 percent in 1999 to 42.2 percent in 2000. 
Service Provider Networks accounted for almost 79 percent of revenues in 2000, with 
Microelectronics and Communications Technology (MCT) representing almost 21 
percent.   
 
In December 2000 Lucent sold its Power Systems business to Tyco International for $2.5 
billion in cash. In April 2001 much of MCT was spun off as Agere, which had 2000 
revenues of about $3.1 billion, excluding internal sales to Lucent, and 16,500 employees 
worldwide.8
 
  The IPO netted $3.3 billion for Agere, while the disposal left Lucent with a 
loss of $3.0 billion. In the first quarter of 2002, Lucent sold its Optical Fiber Solutions 
business to Furukawa Electric for $2.3 billion, of which about $2.1 billion was in cash.   
In 2001, with revenues declining sharply from their 1999 peak, Lucent commenced a 
major restructuring program. By September 2002 Lucent had reduced its employment by 
79,000 people, or 63 percent of its labor force two years before. The divestitures of the 
power business, fiber optic cable business, and microelectronics removed almost 28,000 
people from the company. Most of the remaining headcount reduction of 51,000 came 
through voluntary and involuntary terminations, including an early retirement program 
offered to 8,500 management personnel. In addition, continuing an outsourcing strategy 
initiated during the boom, but accelerated during the decline, Lucent sold or leased 
                                                 
8 Lucent still held 57.4 percent of Agere’s shares, which were distributed to shareholder on a tax-free basis 
on June 1, 2002. 
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several of its major manufacturing plants to contract manufacturers such as Solectron and 
Celestica (see Lazonick et al. 2002; Lazonick and Quimby 2007).   
 
In the process, what had been a highly unionized labor force was decimated. In September 
1999 Lucent had 46,818 US union employees representing 40 percent of its US labor 
force. In September 2006, Lucent had 2,800 US union members, while its two major 
spinoffs, Avaya and Agere, had 2,800 and 26 respectively. As a result, only 15 percent of 
the 38,199 US employees of these three companies were union members.9
 
 
The decline of Lucent’s switching and access business 
 
Figure 8 shows the extent to which Lucent’s switching and access business declined both 
absolutely and relatively from 2001. Lucent was an important supplier of access and 
switching equipment needed to add new residential or business telephone lines to the 
network. Growth in these product lines could be forecasted by tracking the number of 
housing starts in a region. However, the Internet changed this dynamic. As the number of 
Internet “dial-up users” increased, a significant number of residences added second 
telephone lines as dedicated Internet connections. Digital Subscriber Loop (DSL) 
technology would eliminate this problem, but this technology was not extensively 
available or reliable in the 2000 time-frame.   
 
Figure 8: Lucent Technologies sales distribution within the “Service Provider 
Networks” category, 1995-2006 
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9 In addition, Avaya added 2,970 union members outside of the United States as a result of its November 
2004 acquisition of Tenovis Germany GmbH. 
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Figure 9 shows the sharp rise in the number of installed access lines in the United States 
that began in the 1990s, and the sharp decline that began in 2001.  The rise and then fall 
of Lucent Switching & Access revenues tracked these changes in the number of installed 
access lines. 
 
 
Figure 9: U.S. wireline telephone lines supplied by Incumbent Local 
Exchange Carriers within the local loop 
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Source: US Federal Communications Commission 2007. 
 
The demand for local loop access lines did not decline until 2001. However, the tendency 
of Lucent to use discounting to pull orders forward to meet end-of-quarter revenue 
targets, and the willingness of the service providers to place orders in anticipation of 
future needs to obtain these discounts, meant that Lucent began to lose its incumbent 
advantage in 2000. In 2001, as service providers found that they had purchased an 
excessive amount of equipment, they scaled back orders of Lucent wireline products to a 
much greater extent than for Lucent’s competitors. As a result, in 2001 and 2002, Lucent 
experienced a steeper drop-off of orders compared with the other carriers.  
 
The main reason for the decline in demand for access lines was the growing availability 
of cable connections to deliver broadband Internet. In the 1980s and early 1990s, cable 
companies such as Cablevision, Comcast, and Cox Communications invested heavily to 
upgrade their networks. They installed optical fiber and high-speed equipment in an 
effort to offer enhanced services such as interactive cable TV to differentiate themselves 
from satellite companies that were emerging as serious competitors (Young and Grant 
2003). As cable TV companies completed the upgrade of their networks, they realized 
that they were well positioned to offer customers high-speed broadband services that 
were far superior to dial-up. Many Internet users cancelled their second telephone lines, 
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and began to use cable for their Internet services. By 2003 cable TV companies had 
captured 70 percent of the high-speed broadband market (Vascellaro 2007). Lucent was 
not successful in selling equipment to the cable providers. Rather it sold Internet access 
equipment using DSL technology to the traditional regional telephone companies. 
 
Long-haul, metropolitan, and local network expansions were driven by the belief that 
Internet traffic would create an ever increasing demand for high-capacity transport. As 
Lucent and other major equipment suppliers were investing heavily in developing next-
generation equipment for the core network, they were ignoring a fundamental part of the 
network that would eventually become the “broadband bottleneck”. This part of the 
network is known as the “last mile”, the connection between the local access network and 
a residence or small business. The gating item in the “last mile” is the copper wire, 
known as the “twisted pair”, leading from the residence or business to the local access 
network. These copper wires do not have sufficient capacity to carry the broadband 
signals needed for multimedia applications. 
 
This “last mile” bottleneck placed the local telecommunications service providers at a 
disadvantage when competing against the cable companies in the broadband market. 
Cable TV companies, which owned the coaxial cable leading into the home, had an 
advantage because coaxial cable has the necessary capacity to transport high-speed 
broadband signals. In 1999, of the 2,754,000 high-speed access lines installed in the 
United States, 51 percent were coaxial cable and 22 percent were wireline access 
provided by the telecommunications companies (US Federal Communications 
Commission 2000, 2-3).    
 
It was critical that the local service providers find a solution to the “last mile” bottleneck 
to slow down the erosion occurring in the local access market and to capture a share of 
the rapidly growing broadband market, which offered the possibility of new revenue 
sources from “value-added” services. The counter to the competition from the cable TV 
companies in these markets was Digital Subscriber Line (DSL) technology, which could 
be deployed using the “twisted pair” already installed in the “local loop”. 
 
DSL technology was developed in the late 1980s at Bellcore, an R&D consortium created 
by the RBOCs after the breakup of the Bell System. The initial DSL installations were 
ADSL, characterized by a much higher download speed than upload speed over the 
“twisted pair”. This “asynchronous” performance was acceptable for most residential and 
small business users because they did not need to transmit large amounts of data out over 
the Internet.   
 
Throughout the 1990s and in the 2000s, Lucent along with other technology developers, 
equipment manufactures, and international standards bodies worked to create DSL 
systems that were cost and performance compatible with high-speed coaxial cable 
Internet access. These efforts enabled local telecommunications service providers to 
continue earning revenue on their investments in the local loop network, and gave 
equipment manufacturers a new market opportunity to address. 
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The focus on DSL technology was highly successful in closing the gap with cable TV 
companies. As graphed in Figure 10, between 1999 and 2007, the average broadband 
growth rate for coaxial cable access was 51 percent. The ADSL growth rate for the same 
period was 79 percent. Through 2007 coaxial cable remained the leading access 
technology with 52 percent of the installed high-speed lines. However, ADSL had grown 
in application to 42 percent of these lines, a significant accomplishment given the barriers 
that needed to be overcome to “force” high-speed broadband signals through the “twisted 
copper pair”. 
 
Figure 10: Number of high -speed telecommunications “lines” in the United States 
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Lucent took a significant step in the DSL market in September 1999 with the introduction 
of the “Stinger Access Concentrator”, a product platform capable of serving large 
corporations, small businesses, and residential customers. Previously the company had 
been addressing this need by distributing DSL products made by Copper Mountain 
Networks of Palo Alto (Wall Street Journal 1999). The Stinger Access Concentrator is a 
network element initially designed for the central telephone office. It can simultaneously 
provide high-speed data transmission and voice communication over the same copper 
line. Multiple customers are connected through the element using multiplexing 
techniques (Lucent Technologies 1999).  
 
As Lucent entered the DSL market, it found itself in an unusual position; it was not the 
incumbent supplier. Following the breakup of the Bell System, four of the RBOCs, 
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Ameritech, BellSouth, Pacific Telesis, and SBC Communications, formed the Joint 
Procurement Consortium to reduce equipment purchase prices by buying as a group, thus 
recapturing some of the volume purchasing price advantage they had as members of the 
former Bell System. In October 1996 the consortium made the decision to standardize on 
the Alcatel ADSL system for broadband applications in the local loop (Snyder 1996).  
 
This decision made Alcatel the incumbent supplier to the RBOCs, and launched the 
company into global leadership in the DSL market, a position that it retained throughout 
the ten-year history of Lucent. In 2001 Alcatel had 41 percent of the DSL market, 
followed by Siemens with 13 percent and Lucent with 10 percent (Fiber Optic News 
2002). Even though Alcatel retained this leadership position, its market share declined to 
31 percent of the global DSL port market in 2006. As the DSL market grew rapidly in 
Asia, Huawei Technologies, a Chinese telecommunications equipment company, attained 
a market share of 17 percent, making it the second largest DSL port supplier globally.  By 
2006 Lucent’s market share had eroded to 7 percent (Wilson 2005).  
 
The Lucent Stinger platform, applicable to both the ADSL and SDSL (symmetric digital 
subscriber line) systems, helped position Lucent to compete in international markets. The 
initial design was based on development work conducted by Ascend Corporation which 
Lucent acquired in January 1999 (Cambridge Telecom Report 1999). Because of the 
continuous change in the DSL market, the Stinger product platform required regular 
updates. In 2001, the Stinger interface was upgraded to support IP, another indication of 
the decline of ATM as a packet transport protocol.   
 
Lucent was investing in DSL technology at a time when its revenue was rapidly 
shrinking, share price was collapsing, and it had no ability to fund large R&D projects as 
it had done earlier during its history. Stinger served as a good investment because it 
required only incremental changes to accommodate new DSL standards and network 
protocols. It was a product that was sold to incumbent regional telephone companies, a 
customer base that Lucent had historically dominated.  Despite the ongoing investments 
in Stinger, Alcatel remained the market share leader. Lucent’s local access market 
revenue increased but not to the level where it offset the lost revenue from the decline of 
the circuit switch business.     
  
4. Stagnation 
 
Services 
 
Throughout its existence, Lucent frequently changed its financial reportable segments.  
These modifications usually reflected the dynamics of the telecommunications industry, 
new strategies, or changes in the composition of the company because of spinoffs or 
acquisitions. In 2004 Lucent established a new segment, Lucent Worldwide Services, 
signaling the company’s shift from its traditional hardware orientation toward an 
emphasis on professional services. This shift sought to capitalize on Lucent’s 
longstanding expertise in network planning, design, and construction, initially established 
during the Bell System era and then continually refined as a supplier to AT&T and the 
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RBOCs. Through Lucent Worldwide Services, the company now attempted to expand its 
addressable market by offering total network support to telecommunications service 
providers, including those operating multi-vendor networks. The Services segment was 
viewed as an important growth engine for Lucent; a business that could increase 
profitability without requiring large investments in R&D that were typically needed for 
new hardware products. At a time of declining revenue and lower profit margins, the 
Services segment provided a path to increased earnings within an industry environment 
of collapsing hardware sales. 
 
Along with issuing financial results by reportable segments, Lucent also issued results by 
product or services group. The performance of the “Services Group”, not to be confused 
with Lucent Worldwide Services, was initially reported in 1997.  Figure 11 shows the 
annual revenues attributed to the “Services Group” from 1997 through 2006. Note, 
however, that the composition of the group changed frequently over this period.  
 
 
Figure 11. Lucent Technologies “Services Group” revenue, 1997-2006 
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  Source: Lucent Technologies 10-K filings, 1997-2006 
 
Prior to 1998, the “Services Group” revenue was generated by the NetCare Professional 
Services business unit, which designed and installed broadband networks supporting 
convergence of voice, data, and video communication. The unit was strengthened in 1999 
with the acquisition of Ascend Communications and International Network Services. 
Between 1999 and 2002 Lucent classified revenue from professional services generated 
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from sales within the wireline and wireless business units as “Services Group” revenue.  
This classification caused the revenue “bubble” seen in Figure 11.  In 2002 this practice 
was stopped, and professional services revenue was solely associated with contracts 
awarded to this business unit. In 2006, however, the Network Operations Software 
revenues previously reported within wireline businesses were moved into Services, 
reflecting the synergy between the requirements for effective management of multi-
vendor networks and development of advanced software control systems to maintain 
efficient network operation. 
 
During the “stagnation years”, 2004-2006, the “Services Group” revenues increased 
steadily. While the 7.6 percent average annual growth rate achieved was insufficient to 
offset the significant revenue decline experienced in core network equipment sales, 
Services helped to stabilize Lucent total revenue as the company emerged from the 
collapse of the telecommunications equipment industry of the early 2000s.  
 
In 2004 Lucent’s reportable segments included Services along with Integrated Network 
Solutions (INS) and Mobility Solutions (Mobility), both of which were retained from 
prior years. INS included software and wireline equipment for voice networking, data and 
network management, and optical networking. Mobility included software and equipment 
supporting core wireless access networks.  
 
In 2006 INS and Mobility were restructured into three reporting segments: Mobility 
Access & Applications Solutions (MAAS), Multimedia Network Solutions (MNS), and 
Converged Core Solutions (CCS). This restructuring demonstrated Lucent’s intent to be 
recognized in the market as a systems-integration, service-oriented company focused on 
multimedia applications in both wireline and wireless networks. Also, by separating out 
CCS as a standalone segment, Lucent prevented the declining financial performance of 
this segment from tarnishing results in MNS, a segment that was expected to show 
considerably higher growth potential. Mobility Solutions became MAAS, a segment 
focused on 3G wireless networks based on CDMA2000, UMTS/HSPA (high-speed 
packet access), and spread spectrum technologies for mobile voice and data services.  
 
Revenue for the Lucent reporting segments defined in 2006, with results restated back to 
2002, is shown in Table 10. These results show the serious decline in the CCS business, 
which a decade earlier had been the backbone of Lucent’s business. The MNS results 
highlight the outcomes of Lucent’s response to the challenges of both optical networking 
and convergence of voice, data, and video in core and metropolitan transmission 
networks. Revenues from Mobility Solutions declined to 2003, before experiencing a 
partial recovery in 2004-2006.  These results considerably lagged, however, the growth in 
wireless subscribers worldwide. 
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Table 10.  Lucent’s reportable segments, 2002-2006 
 
 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 
Total revenues, $m 12,321 8,470 9.045 9.441 8,796 
Mobility Access & Application Solutions 3,578 3,147 4,166 4,600 4,051 
Integrated Network Solutions 4,599 3,233 2,713 2,413 2,277 
    Multimedia Network Solutions   1,498 1,563 1,677 
    Converged Core Solutions   1,215 850 600 
Services 2,761 1,840 2,044 2,220 2,313 
Other (including intellectual property) 517 250 122 148 155 
Percent of total revenues      
Mobility Access & Application Solutions 29.0 37.2 46.1 49.4 46.1 
Integrated Network Solutions 37.3 38.2 30.0 25.6 25.9 
    Multimedia Network Solutions   16.6 16.6 19.1 
    Converged Core Solutions   13.4 9.0 6.8 
Services 22.4 21.7 22.6 23.5 26.3 
Other (including intellectual property) 4.2 3.0 1.3 1.6 1.8 
 
Optical Networking 
 
Optical products were an important offering in the MNS portfolio that experienced a 
modest market recovery during the “stagnation years”. After the collapse of the optical 
equipment market in 2002, Lucent achieved an optical growth rate of 5.6 percent between 
2003 and 2006. As shown in Figure 12, annual optical equipment revenue during this 
timeframe increased from $760 million to $900 million, approximately one-fourth of the 
level generated during the industry peak. 
 
The collapse of Lucent optical group revenue was directly related to the tremendous 
overcapacity of installed fiber optic networks worldwide. This situation can be attributed 
to the building of excessive core network capacity in the Internet boom in anticipation of 
broadband traffic that did not materialize. The number of independent global 
telecommunications companies that were installing new networks exacerbated the 
problem. Between 1998 and 2001 approximately 39 million miles of fiber optic cable 
were installed within the United States, at a cost of $90 billion. At the time, Merrill 
Lynch estimated that only 2.6 percent of this fiber capacity was actually in use, and 
predicted that most of the cable would remain dark forever (Wall Street Journal 2001).   
 
The huge investment in optical communications networks was primarily driven by the 
belief that Internet traffic would double every 100 days with no end seen to this trend 
(Wall Street Journal 2005). When this growth path was not sustained, 
telecommunications service providers drastically cut back their purchases of optical 
transport and switching equipment.  Investments in technologies such as OC-192 and the 
“all optical switch” did not produce the expected revenue growth and profits.  
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Figure 12. Lucent Technologies “Optical Group” revenue, 1999-2006 
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Source: Lucent Technologies 10-K filings, 1997-2006 
 
Overcapacity in the optical network adversely affected sales of long-haul, high-capacity 
optical products after 2001, but the optical market was changing.  Increasing broadband 
demand at the regional level required capacity upgrades of the metropolitan network that 
served urban areas, industrial campuses, and business locations. Now required were 
optical systems designed for metropolitan applications that could perform similar 
functions to long-haul network systems. These units would be smaller, of lower capacity, 
and at lower prices.   
 
Lucent addressed this market with new products like Lambda Unite that served as a 
bridge to interconnect the regional networks and the high capacity optical core networks.  
The Metropolis product portfolio enabled incumbent service providers to use their 
imbedded base of SONET/SDH equipment for both voice and high-speed data traffic in 
the upgrade of their regional networks.   
 
In 2001 Lucent began a shift in strategy, focusing product development, service 
offerings, and marketing and sales efforts on the needs of the largest global service 
providers. This strategy was based on the realization that 70 percent of 
telecommunications equipment spending was concentrated among the world’s 50 largest 
service providers and that 90 percent of all equipment spending was made in 20 countries 
(Lucent 2001 10-K, 1; Lucent 2002 10-K, 1). Utilizing the new strategy in the marketing 
of its portfolio of metropolitan optical network products, Lucent announced three major 
sales agreements in 2002-2003. Verizon awarded Lucent a three-year contract in April 
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2000 that made Lucent its exclusive provider of DWDM equipment to expand regional 
interoffice core networking throughout the United States. In June 2003 Lucent announced 
that Bell South had selected the Metropolis product family for deployment in its nine-
state area to increase the optical processing capability of its regional networks. Finally, in 
September 2003 Lucent announced a multi-year agreement with AT&T to supply 
Metropolis DMX Access Multiplexers to increase network capacity and enable new 
revenue generating services in AT&T metropolitan networks.   
 
Thus, it appeared that Lucent was again benefiting from its “incumbent advantage” as 
former Bell Systems companies awarded it major contracts. However, several new 
competitors appeared, including Fujitsu, Huawei Technologies, UT Starcom, and ZTE 
Corporation, forcing Lucent to aggressively compete on price, along with features and 
function, to win these contracts. Ultimately, Fujitsu became the market leader with 
Nortel, Alcatel, and Lucent following behind. Even though revenue growth in the optical 
market was achieved during the “stagnation years”, the amount of revenue earned was a 
small fraction of the optical sales obtained during the boom years.   
 
Wireless capability peters out 
 
During the late 1990s Lucent’s wireless sales increased steadily as its North American 
customers installed the necessary infrastructure to support the booming demand for 
mobile voice communications services (see Figure 13).10
 
 Lucent sold wireless systems, 
comprised of base stations and other ancillary equipment linking these stations to the core 
wireline network. Most of these sales were for CDMA technology, even though Lucent 
was able to support TDMA and a small level of GSM, the other dominant digital wireless 
technologies at the time. The wireless networks installed were typically 2G networks 
providing mobile voice communication service to subscribers.  
The Lucent wireless business was very dependent upon a small number of customers.  In 
2002 the five largest customers accounted for 75 percent of the wireless revenue, and by 
2005 had increased to 80 percent. Verizon Wireless and Sprint together accounted for 63 
percent of this revenue (Lucent 2002 Annual Report, 14; Lucent 2005 Annual Report, F-
23). From 2002 through 2005 the number of Lucent installed base stations grew from 
70,000 to 140,000 units. This growth was driven by a transition from 2G, basic mobile 
voice service, to 3G networks, enabling mobile high speed data access along with voice 
communications. 
 
This dependence on a small number of wireless service providers made Lucent 
vulnerable to the capital spending patterns of these companies. As seen in Figure 13, after 
2000 the company’s wireless revenue decreased steadily until 2004. In the 2002 Annual 
Report (p. 14), this decline was attributed to “a decline in capital spending by certain U.S. 
service providers” and completion of various projects. Even more significantly, in the 
2003Annual Report (p. F-20), Lucent acknowledged that two of its customers, AT&T 
and Cingular, had selected an alternative technology to its TDMA product for 
                                                 
10 On the growth in demand in the last half of the 1990s through 2007, see data in FCC Information Center 
2007. 
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deployment in their 3G wireless networks. These two companies elected to deploy GSM, 
a technology in which Lucent had made a minimal investment but one that was dominant 
throughout the world. To compete for 3G deployments, Lucent offered service providers 
CDMA2000, a derivative technology of GSM or UMTS. 
 
Figure 13. Lucent Technologies “Wireless Group” revenue, 1997-2006 
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Source: Lucent Technologies 10-K Filings 1997-2006 
 
To increase wireless revenue, Lucent needed to compete for international customers. 
However, CDMA2000 systems had limited application internationally. It was necessary 
for Lucent to develop new 3G equipment more compatible with the installed base of 
globally deployed GSM systems. Lucent decided to invest in the development of UMTS 
equipment, a technology that was recognized by many as “next-generation GSM”. In its 
2001 10-K filing (p. 9), Lucent proclaimed: “We have already brought to market spread 
spectrum CDMA-2000-networks in North America and expect to supply UMTS networks 
in Europe and Korea in the near future.”  The following year Lucent claimed: “We have 
built more CDMA networks than anyone else, and we are leveraging that expertise to 
establish a strong position in the very early stages of UMTS deployment.”  The Lucent 
strategy was to leap-frog competitors who were supplying equipment for the gradual 
migration of 2nd generation GSM networks to 3G capability by offering UMTS products 
that would enable a “flash cut” to the next-generation GSM technology.    
 
In 2003 Lucent announced that it had “built 27 3G networks in 14 countries, or 43 
percent of the 63 commercial 3G networks deployed” (Lucent 2003 10-K, 9)  In 2004 
Lucent reported “33 3G networks in 17 countries, or 29 percent of the 114 commercial 
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3G networks deployed” (Lucent 2004 10-K, 9)  In 2005 the 10-K filing  (p. 8) simply 
stated that Lucent had “deployed these networks with more than 35 customers on the 
continents of North and South America, Asia, Europe and in the Australia, New Zealand 
region”.  Lucent did not report on the total number of base stations installed as it had 
done since 2002.  In 2006 the company decided to omit any comment on the subject.   
 
In the 2005 Annual Report (p. F-23), Lucent acknowledged: “Substantially all of 
Mobility revenues are currently generated from CDMA technology.  UMTS revenues to 
date have been limited to the sale of data cards and revenue related to a UMTS contract 
with Cingular that was not significant during fiscal 2005. We are conducting third-
generation W-CDMA/UMTS trials in China and Japan.” In 2006 the company announced 
an expansion of the supply agreement with Cingular to provide UMTS equipment 
supporting Cingular’s 3G network in the United States.  Despite this, in the 2006 Annual 
Report (p. F-21), Lucent acknowledged lower UMTS data card sales internationally as 
being partially responsible for the decline in total wireless revenues that year. The 
company was also still awaiting results from UMTS product trials in China. 
 
Clearly, Lucent’s competitive advantage in supplying 3G networks, based on 
CDMA2000, had eroded over these years. A major reason for this loss of competitive 
advantage was the failure of Bell Labs innovation to leverage the company’s expertise in 
CDMA technology “to establish a strong position” in UTMS networks, as had been the 
expectation in 2002. When Lucent decided to forgo investment in GSM, the most widely 
deployed wireless technology, it gambled that it would be able to establish CDMA 
globally as a strong alternative that would serve as an engine for growth in the wireless 
market. Lucent would then seek to supplement its presence in CDMA with UMTS 
technology to compete for international wireless sales. This strategy failed. Lucent’s 
attempts to develop UMTS capability took place at a time when the company was 
financially constrained. In the period 2003-2006, the company’s R&D spending, on an 
annual basis, was only 27 percent of its level in 1997-2000 and only 41 percent of its 
level in 2001-2002. As the communications technology industry recovered with the 
wireless boom, Lucent had very limited resources available to develop new capabilities 
and create new products. 
 
5. Explaining Lucent’s rise and demise   
 
As a “127-year-old startup”, Lucent Technologies came into the world in 1996 endowed 
with a deep heritage of technological capabilities and established market channels on 
which it could build. At the same time, the raison d’être of the Lucent spin-off was to 
position the company for benefitting from the new technologies and capturing the new 
markets offered by the Internet revolution. As that revolution unfolded, Lucent combined 
both the old and the new as it leveraged its “incumbent advantage” to sell legacy 
equipment to its traditional customers to address the accelerated demand for second 
telephone lines used for dialup Internet access. In addition, Lucent engaged the new 
world of broadband as it manufactured optical networking equipment not only for AT&T 
and the RBOCs but also for some of the “next-generation” service providers that the 
Internet boom had brought into existence. 
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By 2000, as the Internet revolution approached its pinnacle, Lucent had reached the limits 
of its incumbent advantage, as alternatives to dialup Internet became more readily 
available. At the same time Lucent found itself lagging competitors in optical 
networking, most significantly by Nortel. At this point Lucent’s top executives became 
concerned with the sustainability of an increase in the price of the company’s stock, in 
part because their own remuneration depended on its performance. It was not lost on 
Lucent’s executives that when Henry Schacht stepped down as chairman of the company 
in February 1998, he cashed in his stock options for a gain of $65.0 million, after less 
than two years on the job. In that fiscal year, Rich McGinn, the new chairman as well as 
CEO, generated $3.6 million from exercising stock options as part of his total 
remuneration of $25.3 million, which included a restricted stock grant of $8.6 million and 
a bonus of $11.9 million. In 1998 five other executives named by Lucent in its proxy 
statement averaged total compensation of $8.2 million, including averages of $1.9 million 
from exercising stock options and $3.8 million from restricted stock grants. Given the 
pervasive roles that the stock market had come to play in US corporations in the Internet 
boom, these executives could also claim that Lucent needed to sustain the increase in its 
stock price to attract and retain key employees as well as to compete for New Economy 
acquisitions (see Carpenter et al. 2003).   
 
In this world of stock-based compensation as well as stock-based combination (M&A 
activity), during 1999 and 2000 – the peak years of the Internet boom – Lucent found 
itself at a disadvantage compared with the other major communications technology 
companies, and especially Nortel and Cisco. As shown in Figure 14, between April 1996 
and December 1999, Lucent’s stock price increased by over nine times, a greater increase 
over this time period than that for any of its main rivals except Nokia.11
 
  As can also be 
seen in Figure 14, however, by the last half of 1999 the rate of increase of Lucent’s stock 
price (shown on a logarithmic scale) was slower than that of all its major competitors. 
Indeed, Lucent’s stock price reached an all-time high in December 1999, whereas the 
stock prices of the other companies continued to rise for several months thereafter. 
Cisco’s stock price increased by 53 percent from December 1999 to March 2000 – at 
which time the company could boast the highest market capitalization of any company in 
the world – and as late as December 2000 its stock price was still higher than it had been 
a year earlier.  Nortel’s stock price peaked in July 2000, at which time it was 62 percent 
higher than in December 1999, and in October 2000 was still higher than it had been in 
December 1999. 
                                                 
11  From April 1996 to December 1999, Lucent’s stock price increased 9.4 times compared with 8.4 times 
for Nortel, 2.5 times for Alcatel, 9.2 times for Cisco, 6.5 times for Ericsson, 2.5 times for Motorola, and 
1.4 times for Nokia. 
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Figure 14. Stock-price movements of shares of Lucent and its major competitors, 
1996-2003 
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In its efforts to pad revenues and earnings to give its stock price a boost, Lucent engaged 
in creative accounting such as channel stuffing and excessive vendor financing of next-
generation service providers. In 1999 and the first half of 2000, as we have seen, the 
company also made a number of expensive, but unwise, technology acquisitions, using its 
stock as the combination currency. All of these decisions, which came from Lucent’s top 
management, created turmoil in the company. The more immediate result was the ouster 
of CEO Rich McGinn in October 2000 (just a year after the Lucent board of directors had 
awarded him a $5.1 million bonus for 1999).  The longer term consequence was a 
weakening of the financial condition of the company even before the Internet bust of 
2001 and 2002. 
 
In the downturn, Lucent was compelled to engage in a massive downsizing to avert 
bankruptcy. Its layoff decisions reflected a desperate attempt to stay afloat rather than a 
strategic restructuring plan.  When 8,500 managers and engineers accepted Lucent’s early 
retirement offer in July 2001, the company lost tens of thousands of years of irreplaceable 
experience. By 2003 many of Lucent’s key manufacturing plants had been shut down.  
Among them was the Merrimack Valley Works in North Andover, Massachusetts; just 
three years before, in June 2000, with a workforce of 5,600, this plant had been declared 
Lucent’s worldwide center of excellence for optical networking production (see Lazonick 
and Quimby 2007). 
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As we have also seen, when the communications technology industry began to recover 
from 2003, the divestitures of the enterprise networks division as Avaya in 2000 and the 
microelectronics division as Agere in 2001 left Lucent lacking in critical capabilities for 
growth.12 The decision to divest the enterprise networks division had been announced in 
March 2000 as Lucent tried to improve its financial performance by ridding itself of 
“slower-growing” businesses. When Lucent had disappointed Wall Street with its first 
quarter 2000 earnings announcement in early January 2000, its stock price had 
plummeted by 20 percent, and through the end of February 2000 was down some 30 
percent from its peak levels in December 1999. The announcement of the intent to spin 
off this division on March 1, 2000 sent Lucent’s stock up over 14 percent in one day. 
Analyst Paul Sagawa of Sanford Bernstein & Co. stated that the enterprise networks 
division had been “something of a drag on Lucent’s overall results,” and that the spinoff 
would turn Lucent into “an extremely vibrant growth engine” (Tampa Tribune 2000).13
 
 
The decision to divest Agere was first announced on July 20, 2000 at the same time as 
Lucent revealed that it had lost $301 million in the third quarter of 2000 because of 
charges for acquisitions and discontinued operations. The company also warned that 
earnings results for the next two quarters would fall substantially short of analysts’ 
expectations (Johnson 2000a). In simultaneously announcing the divestment of the 
microelectronics division, Lucent was clearly hoping to offset the adverse market 
reaction to its earnings report.  
 
At the time more than 75 percent of the sales of the microelectronics division came from 
Lucent’s competitors. In providing the rationale for the spinoff, CEO McGinn argued:  
 
This new company will be able to accelerate its growth now that it’s free from 
this strategic conflict. This move will also unleash the shareholder value of our 
microelectronics business, whose success will now be more fully recognized 
outside of Lucent’s larger communications networking systems business. At the 
same time, Lucent will now be able to completely focus on the largest network 
build-out in world history, a more than $225 billion global opportunity in 
broadband and mobile Internet infrastructure that is expected to double in five 
years. We will concentrate our investments, resources and management attention 
on a triple-play of optical, data and wireless solutions with the network design, 
consulting and integration services to support them. The communications 
infrastructure and semiconductor markets have become so big, so fast-moving and 
so competitive that it is time to divide in order to accelerate growth. (Quoted in 
Levine 2000) 
 
                                                 
12 For an in-depth case study of the importance of maintaining control over chip design for a major 
communications technology company, see the study of Ericsson by Glimstedt et al. (2010). 
13 As an independent company, Avaya saw its revenues decline from $6.8 billion in 2001 to $4.1 billion in 
2004, and incurred losses that totaled $1.1 billion in 2001-2003 before becoming profitable in 2004-
2006, generating a total of $1.4 billion in net income. The 31,000 employees at Avaya when it was 
created on September 30, 2000 were reduced to 18,500 by September 30, 2006. In November 2007 
Avaya was taken private, and in December 2009 it acquired Nortel’s enterprise network business for 
$900 million, bringing Avaya’s payroll to 21,000 employees (Wallis-Jones 2009). 
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In sharp contrast to the stock market’s reaction to the announcement of the spinoff of 
the enterprise networks division the previous March, the market was not convinced 
by these arguments – or at least was not willing to pay a high price for Lucent’s stock 
for prospective gains that would take some time to appear. Lucent’s stock price fell 
almost 16 percent on the day of the announcement. Indeed Lucent’s stock prices in 
the days prior to the news of the microelectronics spinoff were the highest that the 
company had recorded since the price boost from the news of the enterprise networks 
spinoff in early March.14
 
 As it turned out, Lucent’s stock price never recovered from 
its sharp fall on July 20, 2000 (see Figure 14). A year later it was at about 14 percent 
of its level of July 21, 2000, and thereafter fell to as low (in October 2002) as 1 
percent  and moved back up (in January 2004) to no more than 9 percent of that level. 
This is not to say that Lucent’s competitors were immune from significant damage in the 
Internet bust of 2001 and 2002.15
 
 Nortel’s success in selling optical networking 
equipment in 2000 did not save it from suffering a destructive collapse that ultimately, a 
decade later, left the company bankrupt and selling itself off in pieces. A study of the 
demise of Nortel Networks, comparable to our study of Lucent, could add significantly to 
our understanding of the destructive influence of financialized decision-making in a high-
technology industry. So too would a study of Alcatel, which, for example, as Carpenter et 
al. (2003) have shown, was much more prudent than either Lucent or Nortel in its 
technology acquisition strategy in the Internet boom. As for Cisco Systems, the company 
that perfected the stock-financed, growth-through-acquisition strategy which Lucent and 
Nortel sought to emulate, it failed in its attempt to build on its optical networking 
acquisitions of the late 1990s to become a major competitor within the communications 
infrastructure market but has continued to dominate the markets for enterprise networks 
and, increasingly, home networking equipment. 
In the first decade of the 21st century, wireless communications offered the fastest-
growing market opportunities for companies such as Lucent, Nortel, and Alcatel. Here 
the dominant companies are Nokia (including Nokia Siemens Networks), Motorola and 
Ericsson, with the Chinese company, Huawei Technologies quickly gaining ground. 
Nokia has been a juggernaut, hitting its peak revenues of $74.6 billion in 2007. Nokia’s 
revenues, which had grown by 3.3 times from 1996 to 2000, declined by only 3 percent 
in 2001 before doubling to $54.6 billion in 2006 – compared with Lucent’s final year 
revenues of $8.8 billion. Motorola revenues declined by 29 percent in 2001-2002 from 
$37.6 billion in 2000, but then bounced back to $42.9 billion in 2006 before spiraling 
down to only $22.0 billion in 2009. From 2000 to 2003 Ericsson’s revenues fell 43 
percent before recovering to a peak of $29.3 billion in 2007. To get back on track, 
                                                 
14 Agere was eventually spun off in June 2002, after Lucent recorded losses for the division of $4.6 billion 
on revenues of $4.1 billion in fiscal 2001. As an independent company from 2002 to 2006, Agere 
generated total revenues of $9.2 billion and incurred losses that totaled $2.2 billion. In April 2007 Agere 
was acquired for $4.0 billion by LSI Corporation (Taylor 2007). At the end of fiscal 2002 Agere had 
10.700 employees, down from the 17,400 employees in Lucent’s microelectronics division two years 
earlier. By the end of 2006, Agere’s headcount was down to 5,100. 
15 We are currently engaged in a project to write parallel cases on major competitors in the communications 
technology industry, including Alcatel-Lucent. As this project progresses, the research outputs will be 
posted on the website of theAIRnet (www.theAIRnet.org) 
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Ericsson had to cut employment from 105,000 in 2000 to less than 51,000 in 2004.  But, 
as Glimstedt et al. (2006) have shown, Ericsson downsized in a deliberate way that left its 
organizational capabilities intact. With 2009 revenues of $24.0 billion, Ericsson remains 
on an even keel, and for the first time surpassed the faltering Motorola in total sales.  
Meanwhile since 2004 Huawei Technologies’ revenues have increased eight-fold from 
$3.8 billion to $30.2 billion. 
  
In the first half of the 2000s, the accelerated growth in wireless networks worldwide 
provided Lucent with an excellent opportunity to globalize its business and diversify its 
customer base. During the late 1990s Lucent had focused on TDMA and CDMA wireless 
technologies, the dominant network standards in North America. This decision positioned 
Lucent poorly for taking advantage of the largest opportunity for growth, the global 
wireless subscriber market where GSM technology, emanating from Europe, dominated 
networks. In the 2000s Lucent not only had to make investments for the transition from 
2G to 3G networks, but also had to create successor products to GSM technology based 
on W-CDMA and UMTS. Lucent had to make large R&D investments to catch up with 
well-positioned competitors. In the boom years of 1998-2000, Lucent’s R&D spending 
averaged $5.0 billion per year, representing 13.6 percent of sales. In the bust years of 
2001-2003, R&D spending averaged only $2.4 billion, but was 17.4 percent of sales. In 
the critical stagnation years of 2004-2006, the company’s R&D spending dropped to only 
$1.2 billion per year, about the same percentage of sales as in 1998-2000, but in nominal 
dollars less than one-quarter of the absolute amount. Lucent’s failure to increase its share 
in the global wireless market in the 2000s is evident in the geographic distribution of its 
annual revenues. From 2003 Lucent’s revenues from outside the United States were 
approximately the same as when Lucent was initially formed in 1996 as an independent 
company.  
 
By the mid-2000s it became evident that Lucent had the choice of becoming merely a 
“niche” player in the communications technology industry or finding a partner to 
supplement its resources so that it could compete once again as a “full line” supplier. In 
May 2001 Alcatel and Lucent had held initial merger talks with a view to creating a $50 
billion global firm.  A year earlier Lucent would have dominated such a combination. By 
May 2001, however, Lucent had already been severely damaged by the downturn in the 
telecommunications industry. In contrast, Alcatel sales and profits remained strong at the 
time of the merger talks.  If the merger had gone through Alcatel shareholders would 
have owned 58 percent of the combined company, even though it had been agreed that 
the new headquarters would be in Murray Hill, New Jersey, with Alcatel Chairman Serge 
Tchuruk running the company.  In the end, the 2001 merger failed when Alcatel insisted 
that, given its stronger position, it would select 8 of the 14 board members, while Lucent 
Chairman Henry Schacht insisted that his company send two more members for an even 
split (Sorkin and Romero 2001).  
 
Subsequently, Alcatel also succumbed to the Internet bust that during the last of half of 
2001 spread to Europe. After drastic restructuring, both companies recorded profits in 
2004. But in 2006 Alcatel had revenues that were 84 percent greater than Lucent’s.  
Moreover, after 2004 Alcatel’s employment began to increase, reaching almost 60,000 
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people in 2006, whereas Lucent’s employment continued to decline, falling below 30,000 
on September 30, 2006. On December 1, 2006 the French company absorbed the 
American company into Alcatel-Lucent. 
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